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THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
1945-60

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM
AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDY
OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

By
James Alexander Winnefield
April 1960

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PREFACE

The researcher examining the contemporary foreign policy of a state and the military operations supporting it is often greatly handicapped since he usually does not have access to classified documents which are related to the subject matter. Inasmuch as the time period encompassed by this study lies in the immediate past, a past which forms the basis of the uneasy present, it is only natural that access to such documents is limited.

This study reflects this limited availability of pertinent information in addition to the usual shortcomings of a sailor's venture into scholarship. In the opinion of the reader one of these shortcomings may be the author's apparent bias. For this no apology is made; a thesis is by definition "a proposition to be maintained or defended in argument."¹ The possible existence of an antithesis is cheerfully admitted.

The reader is expected to have some knowledge of the development of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia since 1945. The material presented in Chapter II is included merely to provide a short résumé of that policy. No attempt has been made to write history on the pages that follow. The

¹Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1957).

primary endeavor has been to evaluate the performance of an instrument of foreign policy by employing the fruits of studies in history (in Chapter II) and a conceptual model (in Chapter III). The evaluation resulting (in Chapter V) is not definitive since our perspective in time is far too short. The final evaluation will have to await the day when American power is no longer required to preserve the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia from Communist encroachment.

The assistance of Professor Anthony E. Sokol in directing this writer's research is gratefully acknowledged. Dr. Sokol's keen interest in sea power and penetrating analyses of the security problems facing the United States have furnished the point of departure for this study. The candid comments of Professor Claude A. Buss, who reviewed the first draft of this study, have been very helpful and many of his suggestions have been incorporated in the final draft. This writer takes full responsibility for all opinions expressed in this study. The propositions presented should not be construed as representing those of the Navy or the Department of Defense. All illustrations have been taken from the pages of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (copyright 1960 by the U.S. Naval Institute) with the permission of the publisher.

James Alexander Winnefeld

Palo Alto
April 1960

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Capable as it is, naval power does not exist for itself; it exists for the country. It exists to carry out the international objectives of the United States, to guarantee our freedoms: freedom of the seas, man's freedom, our allies' freedom.¹

The United States Navy has a long and proud tradition of service in the Far East and Western Pacific, both in peace and in war. War-time victories at Manila Bay, Leyte Gulf, Okinawa and Inchon take their places alongside such political triumphs as Perry's opening of Japan in 1854, the voyage of the Great White Fleet through Asian waters in 1908, and the frustration of Chinese Communist efforts in 1958 to force abandonment of the offshore islands.

One may argue that at no time in American history has sea power been as necessary an instrument of U.S. foreign policy as it has in the years since World War II. During this period the United States has been more dependent than ever before on foreign bases, raw materials and military support. In addition sea power has furnished the binding cement of the alliances of the free world which have been a requirement for American survival. The preponderance

¹Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, before the Newspaper Editors Luncheon, Minneapolis, Minnesota, July 18, 1959.

of naval power, a basic component of sea power, in the hands of the West was and remains, perhaps, the greatest stabilizing influence of the cold war.

The West has applied its naval power in two critical areas since 1945; they are the Mediterranean and the Far East. This study comprises an examination of the latter, specifically Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, unlike the Mediterranean, the United States has been directly confronted with Sino-Soviet power. In Asian waters the United States Navy forms an integral part of the defense perimeter of the free world, while in the Mediterranean the Navy has the role of backbone and backstop.

Scope and Purpose

This study utilizes the following components:

(1) the U.S. Navy, (2) the post-World War II foreign policy of the United States, (3) Southeast Asia. The purpose is to examine and evaluate the naval contribution to the achievement of American foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia in the light of modern naval capabilities. The emphasis is on the political aspects of selected naval operations and the manner in which these operations were utilized to realize foreign policy objectives. An endeavor has been made to form a nexus between foreign policy on the one hand and naval operations on the other, using Southeast Asia since 1945 as a case study.

The focus of this study has been placed on the years between 1945 and 1960, a period which saw great changes in the world political scene. The victorious allies of the Second World War had split their alliance asunder. Two of them were intent on the expansion of their power by any profitable means while the others sought to preserve their national independence and the heritage of Western democracy. In these years new nations emerged as a discredited imperialism withered. Both the free world and the Soviet colonial empire attempted to capture the symbols that would attract the newly independent into their respective camps. During this period the United States took up the unaccustomed burden of world leadership. With the emergence of a bipolar world political system, the United States assumed many of the responsibilities carried by Great Britain in the nineteenth century. This was particularly true in Asia.² As in the case of their Anglo-Saxon forerunners, Americans were obliged to wield Neptune's trident in the interests of world peace and freedom.

The free world was fortunate that at the time the United States undertook its leadership, the U.S. Navy was the strongest in the world.³ Although threatened by

²William H. Hessler, "Air-Sea Power on the Asian Perimeter," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings (hereafter abbreviated USNIP), LXXVII (October, 1951), 1025.

³In 1945 the United States Navy was three times as large as the British Navy, the next in size. E.B. Potter (ed.), The United States and World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1955), p. 890.

burgeoning Soviet naval strength, the sea supremacy of the free world was maintained during the period encompassed by this study.

For purposes of this analysis Southeast Asia is defined as including the following states, or portions of states, and their adjacent waters: East Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam, Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia (including the colonial remnants on the island of Borneo), the Philippines, and Taiwan.

In dealing with Southeast Asia this study has as its setting, perhaps, the most vital theater of the cold war. These waters have been the scene of the greatest peace-time concentrations of U.S. naval power in history. This concentration has been the result of three principal factors. In the first instance the most dangerous overt threats to world peace since the end of World War II have occurred in East Asia. With the exception of the Communist adventure in Korea the principal points of contact, and conflict, between the Soviet colonial empire and the free world have been in Southeast Asia (as that area has been defined in the preceding paragraph). Today, Quemoy is the warmest spot of the cold war.

A second factor explaining the maintenance of large American naval forces in Southeast Asian waters is the geography of the region. Imposing topographical barriers and under-developed economies are characteristic of Southeast Asia. The consequences are poor land communications.

Further, most of the populous states are located on islands or peninsulas. These factors tend to make sea transport the principal, often the only, means of transport both among the nations in the area and with the remainder of the world. These same characteristics tend to make sea-air power the most important military element required to defend the rim-land of Southeast Asia and its island littoral.⁴

Finally, in the geopolitical context Southeast Asia comprises a vital position in the defense of the free world.

Today all shipping between Europe and the Orient via the Indian Ocean must pass through either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Sunda. . . . Control of these two Southeast Asia straits gives dominance over a sea route that is comparable in importance to the Panama Canal route. Furthermore, all intercontinental airways in the Far East traverse the Southeast Asian area.⁵

Terminology

Inasmuch as this analysis is concerned with objectives, capabilities and commitments (in that order), it would be well to have the definitions of these terms fixed firmly in mind.

Objectives

A knowledge of objectives is obviously essential to any decision maker. Such knowledge, while of great importance to the military man, is absolutely essential to the

⁴Hessler, 1026-27.

⁵U.S., Department of State [Far Eastern Series], "Southeast Asia: Critical Area in a Divided World," Background, June, 1955, p. 1.

statesman since he determines, inter alia, the strategic military objectives.

Although the term objective implies ends rather than means, it is clear that it can be both simultaneously, since objectives are part of a hierarchical structure.⁶ An intermediate goal in this structure can be the objective of a given policy while at the same time existing as means to a yet higher objective.

The objective at the top of the hierarchy of goals is called the national interest. The national interest has been defined "as the general and continuing end for which a nation acts."⁷ The national interest is the supreme objective of the state; all other objectives are directly or indirectly means rather than ends. The underlying assumption of international politics is that the primary objective of the state is self-preservation. Its major value is "its own continuous, independent existence."⁸

Objectives, although a generic term for all goals, are normally used to define a specific end, usually at a lower level than the national interest.

Objective is used to mean a specifically defined goal or purpose, for which national action is planned in terms

⁶Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 79.

⁷William Reitzel, Morton Kaplan, Constance Coblentz, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 471.

⁸Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 137.

of maintenance of the national interest. Fundamentally an objective is an aspect of the national interest, delimited and particularized for action in a given context.⁹

Capabilities

In the context of international relations capabilities can be considered synonymous with power. Capability has been defined as "the measure of the capacity of a state to have other states agree with it on matters in which it is interested."¹⁰ Power has been called "the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one's own ends."¹¹ Both power and capability are used to indicate the ability of a state to achieve its objectives. As used in this study capability refers to the capacity of one of the instruments of the state, specifically naval forces.

Inasmuch as capabilities are another way of expressing power and since power applications can be graduated, it is possible to arrange capabilities on a "power spectrum." This spectrum is a conceptual tool to describe the continuum of capabilities. Therefore, it is a useful concept in examining the properties and characteristics of an instrument of power, such as the modern navy.

⁹ Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, 9.

¹⁰ Charles Lerche Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 19.

¹¹ A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 96.

Commitments

Policies are "specific courses of action designed to achieve objectives."¹² While objectives are the ends, policies are the methods. In international relations policy comprises the courses of action that a state implements in its relations with other states in order to achieve its objectives and forward the national interests.¹³

Commitments are "the specific undertakings in support of a specific policy."¹⁴ In this study commitments usually indicate the operations of American naval power in support of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

Organization

There are three threads of thought represented in this study. Each is taken up in a separate chapter. The final chapter is an endeavor to synthesize the subject matter of the three preceding chapters.

Chapter II, which is concerned with United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1960, treats the subject from the standpoint of foreign policy objectives, their development and achievement. Chapter III utilizes the power spectrum to show the continuum of naval capabilities. Chapter IV describes in general terms some

¹² Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblentz, 473.

¹³ Lerche, 4.

¹⁴ Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblentz, 473.

selected naval commitments undertaken by the United States to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

In Chapter V the essential elements of the preceding chapters are related in such a manner as to provide a yardstick with which to measure the Navy's contribution to the achievement of foreign policy goals. Thus, it is an endeavor to relate commitments to objectives in the light of capabilities.

CHAPTER II

U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST

ASIA, 1945-60

There is always a grave risk involved in trying to state simply the goals of any national foreign policy. One is likely to oversimplify the complexities and minimize the inconsistencies.¹

With this caveat in mind an endeavor will be made in this chapter to trace the development of U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia during the first fifteen years subsequent to World War II. Emphasis will be placed on the objectives of American policy in the region. In order to put these objectives in proper context, some reference will be made to U.S. objectives as they applied to the Far East in general.

The Failure of Co-operation with the Soviet Union 1945-47

The period of co-operation with the Soviet Union lasted from the Japanese surrender aboard the Missouri in Tokyo Bay until the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947. After repeated efforts to honorably accommodate itself to the claims and policies of the Soviet Union,

¹Robert Scalapino, "The United States and Japan," The United States and the Far East (New York: published for the American Assembly by Columbia University, 1954), p. 60.

the direction of the United States changed to reflect new objectives.

The principal American objectives at the end of World War II were: (1) settlement with the enemy states, (2) reconstruction of the liberated states, (3) the laying of the groundwork for international order.² The policy utilized to achieve these objectives was based on the same idealistic assumptions that had been characteristic of U.S. foreign policy during the war.

. . . That peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice could be given a universal meaning, that when so defined these goals would be sought by all men and that the only requirement for their achievement was that governments . . . should work harmoniously and co-operatively.³

That this policy would not hold up under the realities and strains of world politics soon became evident. "This approach to the post-war international settlement limped along for two years, when it finally collapsed under the weight of the manifest evidence that both the major problems and the chief assumptions were not the relevant ones."⁴ President Truman's message to the Congress on March 12, 1947, proposing aid for threatened Turkey and beleaguered Greece marked the formal end of the Soviet-American honeymoon.

²Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, 42.

³Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, 83.

⁴Roy Macridis, Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 400.

The most pressing immediate U.S. objective in the Far East was the liquidation of the administrative problems left in the wake of the Japanese surrender. This essential task, a prerequisite to the laying of the groundwork for international order, was aggravated by the quick and partially unexpected termination of the war in August 1945. The principal parts of this task included: (1) the disarming and repatriation of Japanese troops and nationals, (2) the transfer of newly liberated territories from Japanese to Allied administration, (3) the re-activation of transport facilities in the area, including the sweeping of the many war-time minefields, (4) the prevention of famine and pestilence that threatened as a result of the collapse of the Japanese occupation machinery.

The shift from Japanese to Allied government in some areas was to be the source of many serious problems. Just prior to the Japanese surrender the boundaries of General MacArthur's theater of operations in the Southwest Pacific were altered so that much of Southeast Asia was made the responsibility of Admiral Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command.⁵ As a result, the first Allied forces landing in Java, Malaya, and southern Indo-China were British. Native

⁵Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 292. The Philippines, except for scattered Japanese resistance, had already been regained by American forces. Taiwan and Tonkin were occupied by Chinese Nationalist forces shortly after the Japanese surrender.

populations in Southeast Asia were not inclined to welcome back their former colonial masters--or their temporary agents, British military forces. The efforts of the old colonial powers to re-establish the status quo ante bellum became a prime source of political instability in a Southeast Asia ablaze with the flames of nationalism kindled by Japanese policies.

In April 1946 President Truman reviewed the situation in the Far East as a whole and set forth the specific post-war objectives of the United States in the region: (1) political rehabilitation of Japan, (2) the establishment of an independent and democratic Korea, (3) a democratic and politically unified China, (4) independence of the Philippine Commonwealth, (5) economic rehabilitation of all Asian states, (6) restoration of a normal flow of trade.⁶

Although somewhat successful in achieving some of these objectives, as in Japan and the Philippines, by mid-1946 it was apparent that Soviet foreign policy goals in the Far East, as elsewhere, were inconsistent with those of the United States. This clash was most obvious in those regions, such as Manchuria and Korea, where the Soviet Union was maintaining sizeable military forces.

In Southeast Asia the Soviet Union sought to exacerbate an already unstable political situation in the colonial

⁶"Address by the President," Department of State Bulletin, XIV (April 14, 1946), 623.

areas formerly under Japanese control. Making a strenuous, often successful, effort the Soviet Union attempted to identify itself with the burgeoning nationalism of Asia. To exploit the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia the Soviet Union aimed a steady stream of propaganda at the region, conducted an opportunistic campaign of political sniping at the returning colonial powers and the United States, and abetted insurrection.⁷ The continued political instability hampered economic rehabilitation; the lack of economic progress in turn engendered further political difficulties.

The United States attempted to walk the narrow line between a natural sympathy for the national aspirations of the people of the region and a concern for the interests of its Western European allies. These allies were convinced that their post-war recovery depended to a considerable degree on the retention of their productive colonies in Southeast Asia.

The initial U.S. response to this dilemma was a "hands off" policy. American military power was withdrawn from the area. In an act of great dramatic impact on the peoples of Southeast Asia the United States fulfilled its promise of independence for the Philippines. Concurrently

⁷Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 676-77, 687-91, and Joseph Frankel, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951, Max Beloff (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 209-11.

with these moves the returning colonial powers, usually with lend-lease equipment obtained during World War II, attempted as best they could to impose forcibly the status quo ante bellum in Southeast Asia.

From an initial position of complete support for the concept of national self-determination the United States, under the impact of the exigencies of the cold war, was forced to retreat to a position of only qualified support for that objective. Professor Buss states: "Asians lost confidence in the United States as the champion of the 'free,' after the compromises with hated colonialism in Indonesia and Indo-China."⁸ This loss of confidence turned to antagonism in some states as the cold war forced the United States to take more energetic measures--collective security agreements and military deployments--to defend the free world. To most Southeast Asians these measures were reminiscent of the jockeying of the colonial powers during the years prior to both World Wars. In them they saw a threat to their newly-won independence.

As a result of the political warfare waged by the Soviet Union both in Europe and in Asia, the American policy of international co-operation was faced with bankruptcy if principles were to be maintained and vital objectives achieved. The year 1947 proved to be a momentous one as

⁸Claude A. Buss, Southeast Asia and the World Today (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1958), p. 91.

American foreign policy veered off in a new direction. Many of the objectives remained the same, but the policy and the assumptions on which it was based were vastly different.

The Genesis of the Containment
Policy, 1947-50

By 1947 informed public opinion as well as the American leadership had come to realize that the Soviet Union represented the major obstacle to the realization of the foreign policy objectives of the United States. Events in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, Turkey, Greece, Iran, China and Korea had laid bare the basic incompatibility of American and Soviet objectives.

Within the Government an awareness was widely developed of the importance of relating intentions and capabilities. Either objectives had to be defined in more limited terms or capabilities had to be brought to a greater condition of readiness for use.⁹

The American policy designed to fit these requirements and to meet the Soviet challenge has been called containment. Its adoption by the United States represented a major turning point in its foreign policy.

The containment concept, although implemented several months earlier in the decision to aid Greece and Turkey, was given its most authoritative and forceful public presentation in July 1947 by its architect, Mr. George Kennan, in a remarkable article in Foreign Affairs.¹⁰ Inasmuch as

⁹Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, 93.

¹⁰"X" [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 566-82.

Kennan was then Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, his article was considered as presenting the official view of the United States Government.

The heart of the Kennan thesis was that "the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies."¹¹ This containment was "designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."¹² The strategic objective of containment gave rise to the tactical objectives of forming positions of strength among the free nations on the periphery of the Soviet empire. These tactical objectives were to be accomplished through political, economic and military power.

Except for a brief flirtation with the "roll-back" and "liberation" concept in 1953, containment remained the cornerstone of United States foreign policy in the years following the Second World War. With the rise of Communist China, the containment concept was expanded to take in Communist governments anywhere.

The first official manifestation of containment in American foreign policy was President Truman's message to the Congress on March 12, 1947, proposing financial grants

¹¹Ibid., 572.

¹²Ibid., 581.

to Greece and Turkey in order to assist them in resisting Soviet threats.¹³ Although this policy, to become known as the Truman Doctrine, was not provoked by developments in the Far East, the events in that region formed a significant part of the milieu in which the Doctrine was formulated. Containment as an objective and the Truman Doctrine as a policy played significant parts in subsequent American commitments in Southeast Asia.

The President was explicit in defining the scope of his doctrine. "It must be the foreign policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure."¹⁴ The President's message made it clear that containment was not to be implemented by American efforts alone; other free nations were to be given United States assistance in meeting Communist aggression.

Containment was successful in Europe. The Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and other steps towards economic, political and military integration converted Western Europe from a dangerous power-vacuum into a position of rapidly growing strength. The economic recovery was particularly heartening.

¹³Samuel S. Stratton, "Korea: Acid Test of Containment," USNIP, LXXVIII (March, 1952), 240.

¹⁴"Recommendations on Greece and Turkey," Department of State Bulletin, XVI (March 23, 1947), 536.

Partially as a result of American pre-occupation with Europe's serious problems, the situation in Asia was less satisfactory. One writer observed: ". . . Though the basic idea of containment was accepted in 1947, no real attempt was made to implement the theory in Asia until after the collapse of China."¹⁵ Not to be overlooked, however, is the fact that the political climate and economic environment of post-war Asia was far different from that of Europe. These facts greatly influenced the manner in which the containment concept was applied to Asia.

In the years after the war the United States felt that "demands for national self-determination had to be met if a peaceful world was to be achieved."¹⁶

. . . This broad policy position was not significantly modified by the first formulation of a strategy of containment. Consequently, the policies of assistance and alliance that arose from the strategy of containment underwent strange changes as they were applied in regions and to situations in which were operating another range of purposes derived largely from general principles of self-determination.¹⁷

This conflict of objectives was characteristic of American policies in Southeast Asia.

The post-war power-vacuum created by the destruction of Japanese military forces and the continued weakness of China in the face of civil strife was an advantage that the

¹⁵ Marshall Knappen, An Introduction to American Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 428.

¹⁶ Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, 221.

¹⁷ Ibid., 222.

Soviet Union exploited thoroughly. Although the loss of China was quite possibly the result of factors beyond American control, given the nature of the Nationalist Government and the post-war chaos in China, the Communist conquest did force the United States to re-examine the containment objective as it applied to Asia. As in Europe, defense against Communist aggression required governments that were strong politically and economically as well as militarily.

The conquest of China by Communism and the emergence of China as a significant military power was to be of great importance to Southeast Asia. This portion of the continent was no longer remote from the cold war; it had become the sensitive front line of ideological and military conflict. The geographically remote subversive threat of the Soviet Union was re-inforced by the immediately adjacent subversive and military threat of powerful Communist China.

The loss of China forced the United States to apply the containment concept more rigorously in Asia. In January 1950, while "waiting for the dust to settle," the United States defense perimeter in the Far East was outlined by the Secretary of State. This perimeter, or containment-barrier, was based on the East Asian island chain extending from the Aleutians to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines.¹⁸ No commitments were undertaken on the Asian

¹⁸ Dean Acheson [Remarks by the Secretary of State at the National Press Club], "Crisis in Asia," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (January 23, 1950), 111-18.

mainland nor was the Chinese Nationalist garrison on Taiwan placed under the American security umbrella. Those parts of Asia not under Communist domination or guaranteed American protection were left to defend themselves or to rely on the United Nations for their security. The Secretary declared:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee those areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly necessary or within the realm of practical relationship.

Should an attack occur . . . the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then on the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.¹⁹

That this conservative and restrictive interpretation of containment was not adequate to deter Communist aggression was made apparent by the subsequent events in Korea and Indo-China. Southeast Asia with its unstable political situation presented an open invitation to Communist subversion and conquest.

Limited War, 1950-54

During the years between 1950 and 1954 the basic security objective of the United States remained unchanged.²⁰ Containment remained the long-run objective; tactical objectives changed rapidly as a result of shifts in the military situation.

¹⁹ibid., 116.

²⁰This controversial point is discussed infra, p. 34.

Korea

Prior to the summer of 1950 the United States had not been forced to fight to implement its containment objective. The attack on the Republic of Korea by the North Korean regime forced the United States to re-emphasize military defense, often at the expense of economic rehabilitation and development.

A general strategy of containment designed to operate over a long period of time was converted into a specific strategy for meeting a Soviet threat that could become war within a defined period of time. . . . The goals of economic recovery programs were gradually displaced by the more pressing claims of programs to rebuild the military strength of free nations, and a policy of military aid and defensive alliances was expanded to include precise commitments of American forces.²¹

The development of American objectives in Korea after June 1950 is outside the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the initial objective of the United States in Korea was to demonstrate the firmness of the American commitment to the containment objective as implemented by the policy of collective security.²²

When a truce was finally arranged in the summer of 1953, the United States joined with fifteen other members of the United Nations that had committed forces to the defense of the Republic of Korea in affirming that:

If there is a renewal of the armed attack . . . we should be united and prompt to resist. The consequences of

²¹Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblentz, 280.

²²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), II, 334, 388.

such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.²³

The Korean War in drawing the attention of the world to the Far East emphasized other critical points on the containment barrier. Among these points were Indo-China and Taiwan.

Indo-China

Although the warfare in Korea was on a greater scale, the conflict in Indo-China between French Union forces and Viet Minh insurgents had been waged with little interruption since 1946. Until 1950 the fighting in Indo-China was of comparatively small concern to the United States except as it retarded French economic recovery and weakened her military strength in Europe. With the American involvement in Korea the fighting in Indo-China was put into perspective as merely an extension of the Korean front in Southeast Asia. In the same statement in which he committed American naval and air forces to Korea on June 27, 1950, President Truman significantly "directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces."²⁴

²³U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), II, 2662.

²⁴Truman, II, 338-39.

American objectives in Indo-China were consistent with the strategic objective of containment. The specific tactical objectives varied, as in Korea, with the military and political situation. In Korea the United States had found it necessary to reconcile its objectives with those of its United Nations allies. In Indo-China the United States did not choose to intervene directly because Chinese Communist aggression was less clear-cut and was intertwined with the growing nationalism of the peoples of the region. Instead the United States attempted to realize its security objectives through financing the French effort to repulse Communist aggression.

As at other times and in other places since the end of World War II, the United States was faced in Indo-China with a clash between objectives. The objective of supporting the principle of self-determination conflicted with the objective of containing the forces of Communism.²⁵ Since French and American objectives had essentially only one point of tangency--opposition to Communist penetration of Southeast Asia--American objectives were often only incidentally related to the direction of the French program in Indo-China.²⁶

²⁵For an official recognition of this dilemma, see Dean Rusk's address "The Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy," Department of State Bulletin, XXV (November 19, 1951), pp. 822-23.

²⁶Rupert Emerson in his preface to Ellen J. Hammer's The Struggle for Indo-China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. xi-xiii.

The principal American objectives in Indo-China were: (1) elimination of Communist insurgent forces, (2) the formation of governments in the states of Indo-China that would be capable of resisting Communist encroachment and subversion.²⁷ The United States felt that in order to achieve this latter objective, it would be necessary to grant the states of Indo-China complete political independence.²⁸ Until April of 1954 France was not willing to go this far. A primary French objective was the maintenance of a degree of control over the Indo-Chinese states.²⁹ After the fall of Dienbienphu in the spring of 1954 during the Geneva Conference on Asian Problems, the French objective of maintaining an enlightened semi-colonial protectorate in Indo-China became impossible when viewed in the light of French capabilities.

The Geneva settlement ending the fighting in Indo-China made it impossible to achieve completely either American objective. Despite the loss of the northern part of Viet Nam to the Communists, a strong (as later events were to prove) anti-Communist government in South Viet Nam emerged from the peace settlement. The French semi-colonial

²⁷ John F. Dulles, "The Issues at Geneva," Department of State Bulletin, XXX (May 17, 1954), 742.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Collective Defence in Southeast Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 49.

regime was at an end and the path was cleared "for the construction of an anti-Communist containment front in Asia on a firm political basis that otherwise would have been impossible."³⁰ With the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in September 1954, the free portions of Indo-China--composed of Cambodia, South Viet Nam and Laos--came under the protective mantle of a collective security system backed by the United States.

Taiwan

After the debacle of 1949 Nationalist Chinese remnants had sought refuge on Taiwan where they carried out desultory harassment of the new Communist regime on the mainland. In the following months Taiwan was outside the United States-supported containment barrier.³¹ It then seemed only a matter of time until Chiang Kai-shek's government succumbed to invasion or revolt.

After the Communist invasion of the Republic of Korea President Truman in the same statement in which he ordered American sea and air assistance to the peninsula also announced a change in American policy towards the regime on Taiwan.

I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to

³⁰Knappen, 265.

³¹Acheson, 111-18.

cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done.³²

This announcement, popularly called "leashing Chiang," articulated an objective that was to be a cardinal point in American foreign policy for the remainder of the decade. Briefly stated this objective was: keep Taiwan and the Pescadores out of Communist hands.

Shortly after assuming office in 1953 President Eisenhower temporarily "unleashed" Chiang.

. . . There is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that requires the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. . . .

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear: this order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.³³

This move was clearly intended to encourage the Chinese Communists to come to terms in Korea. This phase, which apparently did not have any appreciable effect on the outcome in Korea, outwore its practical utility upon completion of the Korean fighting. With the signing of a mutual security treaty with the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan in December 1954 and a subsequent exchange of diplomatic notes, Chiang was formally constrained from attacking the mainland in any strength without United States approval.³⁴

³²Truman, II, 339.

³³American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, II, 2475.

³⁴"Text of Notes Exchanged on December 10," Depart-

The Pacific Alliance System

The Korean War marked a turning point in American attitudes towards collective security in the Pacific and the Far East. The modest nature of the collective security commitments undertaken by the United States in that region prior to the summer of 1950 is evident in Secretary Acheson's famous National Press Club Speech of January 12, 1950, in which he outlined the American defense perimeter in the Far East.³⁵

The threat posed by Communist imperialism in the invasion of the Republic of Korea forced the United States to accept the responsibility for the defense of free Asia. The alternative was to stand by and watch Sino-Soviet aggression devour the Asian continent. After accepting this responsibility the United States chose to implement its decision by the alliance system that it had used in the Americas and in Western Europe.

Although not without difficulties, the security structures of the Atlantic community were much more tightly knit than were their East Asian counterparts. The diverse characteristics and special problems of the nations of free Asia and the Western Pacific necessitated several treaties to meet the different conditions confronting the various parties interested in Asian defense.³⁶ Even so, several of

ment of State Bulletin, XXXII (January 24, 1955), 152.

³⁵Supra, p. 20.

³⁶Dulles, 742.

the so-called "neutralist" nations of Asia were hostile to any such western-sponsored collective security arrangements. In large measure this hostility was the result of their unhappy colonial experience. Further, as a result of skillful Soviet and Chinese Communist foreign policy, some of the new states of Asia did not share the alarm of the United States concerning the Communist menace.³⁷

The United States during the years 1951 through 1954 concluded six collective security treaties in East Asia and the Western Pacific. In these agreements, binding eleven nations, the United States was the key partner inasmuch as it was the only power capable of rendering substantial military and economic aid to any threatened party.

The effect of these treaties was to extend and formalize the containment barrier. As a result, American objectives were increased in number and defined more precisely. The United States undertook to defend, in effect, the entirety of East Asia not already under Communist domination. These commitments were without precedent in American history. Two of these treaties are of special significance to Southeast Asia and will be considered in some detail.³⁸

³⁷ Hollis W. Barber, "United States Alliances East of Suez," USNIP, LXXXV (July, 1959), 72-73.

³⁸ The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines (August 30, 1951) is not discussed because its most important obligations are included in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty to which both nations are parties.

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.--This treaty was the reaction of the United States to the threat of further Communist expansion into Southeast Asia. Signed on September 8, 1954 in Manila, it followed closely on the heels of the French collapse in Indo-China and the subsequent Geneva Conference of July 1954. Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty were: Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, France and the United States (see figure one).




FIGURE 1

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

This treaty, together with its loose organization popularly called "SEATO," marked the most ambitious peacetime attempt at collective security in the Far East.

The Manila pact attempted to salvage whatever strength remained for the free world in Southeast Asia, but it could not in itself produce miracles. It created no new military forces to protect exposed positions . . . and its ultimate influence would depend upon the will and the intention of all the signatory powers to carry forth its spirit.³⁹

Article IV, paragraph 1, contained the heart of the treaty.

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.⁴⁰

Three states were designated as protected under this article: South Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos. Because of defense commitments undertaken in Malaya by Great Britain, the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore were, in effect, also designated under this article. Article IV, paragraph 3, stipulated that no action could be taken by the treaty signatories on the territory of a designated state without the consent of the latter.

The boundaries of Southeast Asia, as defined in Article VIII of the pact, are more restricted than those

³⁹Buss, The Far East, 719.

⁴⁰U.S., Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3170 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 3.

delimited in Chapter I of this study.

As used in this Treaty, the 'treaty area' is the general area of South-East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude.⁴¹

This definition of the treaty area excluded Hong Kong and Taiwan from the pact. The only nations, parties to this treaty, with which the United States had not had prior collective security obligations of some type were Pakistan and Thailand.

Possibly with a view towards the difficulties between India and Pakistan, the United States appended a reservation to the treaty at the time of signature stating that it considered Article IV, paragraph 1, to apply only to Communist aggression.

Security Treaty Between the United States and Taiwan.--Significantly, the Chinese Government on Taiwan was not invited to join the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Several of the signatories had recognized the Peiping regime and did not maintain regular diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government.

To plug this gap in the containment barrier in Asia and more carefully define American security commitments in the Taiwan area, the United States concluded a mutual defense treaty with the Chinese Government on Taiwan. In purpose, coverage and terminology it was similar to the

⁴¹Ibid., 4.

other collective defense treaties negotiated by the United States in the years after 1950. This treaty clearly defined the territories covered by its provisions.

The terms 'territorial' and 'territories' shall mean with respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction.⁴²

Conspicuous by its absence was the lack of any commitment by the United States to defend the offshore islands against attack.

In an exchange of notes on December 10, 1954, a week after the signing of the treaty, Chiang's government was effectively restrained from operations against the mainland without American concurrence.

In view of the obligations of the two Parties under the said treaty, and of the fact that the use of force from either of these areas by either of the Parties affects the other, it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to the actions of an emergency nature which is clearly the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.⁴³

Stalemate, 1954-60

During these years the United States continued to base its policy towards the Sino-Soviet bloc on the objective of containment. The new American administration coming into office in 1953 challenged the containment concept as

⁴²U.S., Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 3178 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 7.

⁴³Ibid., 24.

sterile and offered "liberation" and "roll-back" as alternatives. However, this approach was soon abandoned as the realities of the world situation became more apparent. Containment remained the primary security objective of United States foreign policy in practice, if not in theory.⁴⁴ To implement containment (or to strengthen the "free world's defense perimeter") the United States continued to rely on the mobility of sea-air striking forces in Southeast Asia.

⁴⁴See Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 205-206. For a scathing denunciation of the containment policy, see James Burnham's Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day, 1952), pp. 29-49.

Some would challenge the contention that containment remained the primary security objective of U.S. foreign policy after 1952. The new Republican administration explicitly renounced it as a feature of U.S. foreign policy.

In the famous "brinkmanship" article appearing in Life (January 16, 1956), reportedly based on exclusive interviews with Secretary Dulles, James Shepley maintained (on p. 77):

"The so-called line of containment which the Truman administration had started to build in Greece and Turkey was no line in theory or in fact from Turkey all the way to the Philippines.

"So effectively has Dulles plugged the holes that freedom's defense line has been linked up from Italy to Japan."

As is apparent from this excerpt, some of the criticism directed at the containment policy (and objective) was not that it was the incorrect one, but that it was not really implemented until the Republican administration took office in January 1953.

Reitzel, Kaplan and Coblenz (pp. 325-26) hold that containment was merely re-defined in more military terms. But they date this development from 1950 rather than from 1953. Other authorities state that there has been no essential change in the objective of containment. See Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 778, and James E. King Jr., "Collective Defense: The Military Commitment," Alliance Policy in the Cold War, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 123.

Speaking of SEATO, Secretary Dulles stated:

We shall rely chiefly on mobile Allied power which can strike an aggressor wherever the occasion may demand. That capacity will, we believe, deter aggression. We shall not need to build up large static forces at all points, and the United States contribution will be primarily in terms of sea and air power.⁴⁵

Following the Geneva settlement of 1954 Communist expansion in Southeast Asia was brought almost to a halt. Peiping's protégé, North Viet Nam, continued its attempts at subversion in Laos. The Tachens were evacuated by Nationalist forces while the Chinese Communists periodically stepped up their campaign of bombardment and harassment of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. There was evidence of creeping Chinese encroachment in northern Burma. Frustrated in East Asia Peiping turned its attention to Tibet and India, conquering the former and antagonizing the latter with border forays. There were indications throughout Asia that the menace of Chinese Communist imperialism was being taken more seriously than it had at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955.

These expansionist actions (see figure two) of Communist China kept the political temperature of Asia at fever pitch. Its aggressive adventures could be considered as probes of the containment barrier. Faced with internal difficulties of tremendous magnitude, China flexed its muscles periodically to keep the pot boiling and, perhaps, to

⁴⁵Background, 1.




FIGURE 2
COMMUNIST PRESSURE POINTS IN ASIA
RADIATE FROM PEIPING

distract its long-suffering population from troubles closer to home. The émigré government of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan provided a convenient and logical target for Peiping's venom. The conflict between the two governments focused on their point of closest contact--the offshore islands.

The most serious crises of the years after the Geneva settlement were the result of Communist attacks on these islands. On two occasions--during the autumn and winter of 1954-55 and the summer and autumn of 1958--Communist China and the United States faced each other at the brink of war as a result of aggressive Communist actions in the Strait.

On both occasions the Peiping regime was forced to back down before American resolution which stemmed from a determination not to preside over a Western Pacific "Munich."⁴⁶

Less than two months after the signing of the defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China, a full-blown crisis had developed as a result of Communist pressure on the Tachens, a small group of Nationalist-held islands some 200 miles north of Taiwan. The United States elected to help the Nationalists evacuate the islands; but to forestall further Red Chinese moves threatening Taiwan, President Eisenhower asked the Congress for specific powers concerning the offshore islands. In late January, 1955, the Congress in a joint resolution authorized the President to use American forces to deny the Chinese Communists the possession of "such related positions and territories of that area [Taiwan] now in friendly hands."⁴⁷

In his message to the Congress requesting this authority the President indicated that the United States considered the offshore islands related to the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores as long as the Peiping regime threatened the "liberation" of Taiwan.

⁴⁶ President Eisenhower in a speech to the nation on September 11, 1958, stated: ". . . A Western Pacific 'Munich' will not buy us peace and security."

⁴⁷ "Text of Joint Resolution on the Defense of Formosa," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (February 7, 1955), 213.

I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores. . . . But unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us to take into account closely related localities and actions which, under current conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.⁴⁸

From public statements by the President and the Secretary of State it appeared that the security of the offshore islands was only a transitory objective of the United States. Secretary Dulles declared:

The United States has no commitments and no purpose to defend coastal positions as such. The basic purpose is to assure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be taken forcibly by the Communists.⁴⁹

The door was left open for future negotiation concerning disposition of the islands providing the Chinese Communists were to renounce the use of force in pursuing their objectives in the Strait.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the wording of the various government statements on the American position relative to the islands was sufficiently ambiguous to confuse friend and foe alike. The lack of precision in the American commitments gave the Peiping regime cause

⁴⁸ "Message from the President to Congress," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (February 7, 1955), 212.

⁴⁹ John F. Dulles, "Our Foreign Policy in Asia," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (February 28, 1955), 329. Emphasis added.

⁵⁰ John F. Dulles, "Challenge to Peace in the Far East," Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX (October 13, 1958), 565.

for hesitation in its preparations to seize the offshore islands.⁵¹

The determined American stand in the face of Communist aggression in the Strait, which was again demonstrated during the crisis of September 1958, was not popular with many nations, including some of the staunchest allies of the United States. Many felt that the islands were insignificant and not worth the risks of World War III, while others felt that Chiang's government was not worth saving and a small price to pay for "stability" in Asia. In answering his critics Secretary Dulles declared:

I do not doubt that the Chinese Communists are probing our resolution. They no doubt hope that we want peace so ardently that we will retreat in the face of their threats. . . . However, we do not want it at the price of our security or of our honor. Indeed experience shows that those who try in that way to buy peace in fact only increase the ultimate danger of war.⁵²

Conclusion

After the abortive attempt at post-war accommodation of the Soviet Union, containment became the policy of

⁵¹Secretary Dulles at a news conference on March 15, 1955, stated:

" . . . It is inevitable that the situation be in some ambiguity, because, as I say, these areas [Quemoy and Matsu] are outside of the treaty area and the question of the U.S. use of force for their defense depends upon the circumstances under which an attack upon them occur."

American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, II, 2492.

⁵²John F. Dulles, "Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China," Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (February 21, 1955), 289-90.

the United States in its search for security. Eminently successful in Europe, containment was not rigorously applied in the Far East until after the fall of China and the war in Korea. The events of 1950 through 1954 demonstrated to the United States that more precise and formal commitments of American political, economic and military power would be necessary if East Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, were to be kept out of the Communist orbit. The resulting collective security treaties negotiated by the United States extended and formalized the containment barrier.

The intense nationalism of Southeast Asia during the years after World War II presented significant difficulties for American policy in the region. The dilemma between containment and self-determination was never satisfactorily resolved by American policy-makers. By 1960, however, the colonial powers had been squeezed out of most of Southeast Asia and the problem lost some of its importance. Colonialism, nevertheless, remained the favorite scapegoat of nationalist leaders in Southeast Asia and anti-colonialism still provided a rallying point for the diverse elements that composed the new nations of the region.

In the wake of independence there was left a heritage of suspicion of the West that proved difficult to overcome in spite of such measures as the Colombo Plan and Point Four aid. Inasmuch as they were the only source of substantial power by which Southeast Asia could be militarily

defended against the new imperialism of Chinese Communist expansionism, the United States and the other Western powers were placed in the unenviable position of trying to defend nations that saw no apparent threat to their independence except from their would-be defenders. Nevertheless, with the dawn of a new decade in 1960 there did seem to be a greater appreciation of the true menace of Communist aggression among the new nations of Southeast Asia.

Significantly, the trouble-spots in Southeast Asia during the years after 1954 were those areas where the American security commitments were ambiguous or contingent. An example of the ambiguous commitment was the American position relative to the offshore islands in the Taiwan Strait. Peiping could never be sure whether or not American forces would participate in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu if their invasion were to be attempted. As a result Communist leaders continually probed American determination by manufacturing crises in the region. Each disturbance strained the bonds of Allied unity; but these bonds proved strong enough to bear the burden.

An example of the contingent commitment was the American position vis-à-vis the "designated" states (particularly Laos) of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. According to the treaty a designated state could be defended only at its own request. A Communist engineered coup d'état in such a state would have posed several

difficult questions for the United States and its SEATO allies.

In the summer of 1959 the activities of the Pathet Lao rebels, assisted by North Viet Namese elements, were a constant source of anxiety to the United States government. Fortunately, the Laotian government proved, somewhat unexpectedly, determined to maintain its independence and the crisis passed for the moment. This Communist probe may well have been a means of sounding out the extent of the U.S. commitment in Laos.

By 1960 this type of probing appeared to be a standard feature of the environment in Southeast Asia. The years following the wars in Korea and Indo-China had set the pattern to be pursued in meeting the Communist threat. For its effectiveness this pattern of firm counter-pressure rested heavily on the full spectrum of U.S. military (including naval) capabilities.

CHAPTER III

THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR

The . . . characteristic of naval forces is their versatility. In all-out war they can carry out a diversity of tasks. . . . In peacetime and in periods of localized hostility, naval forces can carry out a number of other tasks. The same vessels that provide essential support to friendly nations under attack, or by their very presence discourage an attack on one of our allies, can undertake such other missions as policing the Korean truce, rendering assistance to a civil population when an earthquake or other disaster strikes, and appearing in one of the ports of a friendly power to play the role of good will emissaries. Thus a wide range of activities is within the ability of naval forces. They do not depend on any single weapon or mode of operation, and they can undertake a variety of tasks short of full scale warfare in furtherance of United States foreign policy.¹

In this chapter the capabilities of one of the instruments of national policy is examined; that instrument is naval power.² Particular emphasis will be placed on the diversity and gradation of naval capabilities and their application to contemporary situations. Although the emphasis of this study is centered on the United States Navy as

¹U.S., Department of Defense, "Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy," Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan. 1-June 30, 1954, 1955, pp. 158-59.

²See James A. Winnefeld, "The Cold War Power Spectrum," USNIP, LXXXVI (January, 1960), 71-77 for a condensed version of the material presented in this chapter.

an instrument of American foreign policy, attention in this chapter is directed to the capabilities of modern navies in general in order to place those of the United States Navy in a broader context.

National Capabilities and Foreign Policy

The instruments of foreign policy may be likened to the instruments of a symphony orchestra. The statesman acts as conductor. The "music" before him is the foreign policy of the state. His "orchestra" is composed of many different instruments. Among them are the state's economic resources, political prestige, allies and armed forces. The task of the conductor is to achieve the objectives of the composer. The composer is the composite of the political leaders of the nation who ascertain and formulate the national aspirations and undertake to achieve those within the bounds of possibility.

Clearly the statesman, political leader, conductor and composer must know the capabilities and limitations of the instruments that carry out their intentions if the result is to be an effective foreign policy or a harmonious melody. In the democracies, where national aspirations are quickly sensed by political leaders, it becomes necessary for the people themselves to have a rudimentary knowledge of the capabilities of the instruments of foreign policy.

The modern navy is one of the more important instruments of foreign policy. This is particularly true of

nations such as the United States which have extensive defense responsibilities and rely heavily on imports of strategic raw materials.

To be most effective, the navy as an instrument of foreign policy, must have its operations co-ordinated with the other elements of national power. Naval strategy "as a part or instrument of national policy, . . . must co-ordinate the use of its special tools and methods with the other forms of national power to promote the achievement of national objectives."³

Having stated that the modern navy is an important instrument of foreign policy and further that its use must be co-ordinated with the other elements of national power, it is necessary to examine the manner in which the exercise of naval capabilities may achieve national objectives. In this context the precise gradations of power that the modern navy can exert assume great significance.

The Power Spectrum

Many writers on military subjects have used the power spectrum device to indicate the gradations of power available to a state in implementing its foreign policy.⁴

³Anthony E. Sokol, "Naval Strategy Today," Brassey's Annual, 1958 (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1958), p. 36.

⁴Among many others see Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 18, 146; Andrew Gyorgy, "The Nature and Character of International Politics," Naval War College Review,

Such a concept is useful insofar as it demonstrates the range and diversity of available power instruments or methods. Further, the spectrum illustrates the fact that there is considerable middle ground between unrestricted war and a condition where moderate amounts of power are exerted. "Like the other tools and techniques, military capabilities cover a wide spectrum of capabilities from the mere hint of a threat on one pole to mass destructive war on the other."⁵

While a serviceable and vivid concept, the power spectrum has received little systematic treatment.⁶ The analogy of the power spectrum to the light spectrum of optics is only a point of departure. In the light spectrum green will always lie between yellow and blue; in the power spectrum various capabilities may exchange places or be identical depending on the value judgments of top-level decision makers.

On a scale of increasing intensity in the use of force from left to right, the various kinds of situations calling for the use of armed force might be arranged in a

XI (May, 1959), 14-20; Anthony E. Sokol, "War and the Atom," Marine Corps Gazette, XI (November, 1957), p. 12-13.

⁵Charles M. Fergusson, Jr., "Military Forces and National Objectives," American Military Policy, ed. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. (New York: Rinehart, 1957), p. 128.

⁶But see Andrew Gyorgy's treatment of the "Spectrum of Conflict" (Gyorgy, 14-20) and William J. Platt's "A Prologue to the Spectrum of Conflict," SKI Journal [Stanford Research Institute], III (Fourth Quarter, 1959), 113-17.

partial spectrum as indicated in figure three. The precise ordering of capabilities would vary with the situation. For example, the navigation by American nuclear submarines under the ice at the North Pole had some of the attributes of a scientific demonstration, but the implications to Soviet leaders were probably in the form of a military threat or demonstration.




FIGURE 3

THE COLD WAR POWER SPECTRUM

The gradations between limited and unrestricted war have been thoroughly examined by many writers. The part of the spectrum to the left of limited war has been comparatively neglected in contemporary literature. Yet, the left side of the military power spectrum comprises the well-worn arsenal of the cold war.

To consider only one side of the spectrum is somewhat unrealistic since the effectiveness of many measures on the left depend upon the threat of, and willingness to

use, the right side if necessary. Diplomacy has been called "negotiation" with war as a possible alternative.⁷

Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile, it must be the task of our military policy to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force.⁸

Determination to protect vital interests is best evidenced by the deployment of instruments capable of employing ultimate sanctions to protect those interests.

The selection of the most exposed regions of Western Europe for maneuvers by the combined forces of the Western allies demonstrates to the Soviet Union the military power of the Western Alliance and the resolution to use this power in defense of the status quo in Western Europe.⁹

Technology and the Spectrum

Proponents of land and air power, usually the latter, frequently belittle the advantages of naval power by pointing to the great technological advancements in their respective fields. Quite often these advancements are only in the drawing board stage; frequently forgotten is the fact that naval technology has kept pace with developments in the other military services. Indeed, in the important field of nuclear power the United States Navy has been in the vanguard of research and development. Significantly, the Navy

⁷Wright, 158.

⁸Kissinger, 201.

⁹Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 73.

has been the first service to combine nuclear propulsion with military weapons systems.

Three areas of technological development in particular have expanded the modern navy's capabilities. The first of these is the naval air-missile strike capability which has made it possible for naval power to exert force far inland. In fact, far from having been superseded by the advent of nuclear-missile weapons systems, naval power by 1960 posed a threat to land power unparalleled in history.¹⁰ The modern navy, by virtue of its mobility and ability to conceal itself, has to a considerable degree outdistanced land-air power in offensive power. This expanded strike capability of naval power can be exerted in the form of threats, deterrents, and actual attacks. The possession of this capability lends authority to the exercise of power on the left side of the spectrum.

The second field in which technological advancement has greatly broadened the navy's capabilities has been in amphibious warfare. Always a useful weapon in the naval arsenal, amphibious assault reached a high degree of development during the Second World War. Post-war innovations included the introduction of the vertical envelopment concept that permitted the projection of naval landing forces (usually marines) to areas behind conventional landing

¹⁰Oskar Morgenstern, "The Game Theory in U.S. Strategy," Fortune, September, 1959, pp. 127, 230-32.

beaches. This technique utilized specially designed helicopter carriers and troop-cargo carrying helicopters.

The final technological advance to be considered is that made in the logistic support of naval operating forces. The endurance characteristics inherent in the age of sail were to a great degree sacrificed with the introduction of vessels powered solely by steam. The long tragicomic cruise of the Russian Baltic Fleet to the Far East in 1905 demonstrated the difficulties inherent in a cruise far from friendly bases. In many respects these difficulties were overcome by United States naval forces during World War II. In the Pacific Ocean campaigns of 1942-45 the practicality and development of mobile logistic support were amply demonstrated. The statesmen of today employing the navy as an instrument of national policy do not have to be acutely solicitous of the need for bases as were their late nineteenth century predecessors. Although some adequate overseas bases remain necessary for the great naval powers, they are not the "ball and chain" that they were fifty years ago.

Other technological advances have also broadened the spectrum of naval capabilities in the era of the cold war. Much could be written on the contribution of the helicopter alone. The characteristics and requirements of that aircraft lend themselves well to the naval milieu. Future developments in this and in other vehicles and weapons systems will undoubtedly further extend the range and diversify the capabilities of naval power.

The Naval Spectrum

Most naval capabilities on the left side of the power spectrum (measures short of war) have, perhaps too frequently, been subsumed under the heading of "showing the flag." This phrase has been applied, often indiscriminately, to indicate good will visits, armed threats, or humanitarian assistance undertaken by naval forces. To many persons "showing the flag" has become synonymous with the peace-time mission of navies.

As a generic term for the peace-time uses and capabilities of naval power "showing the flag" is inadequate to express the precise gradations of power that the modern navy has been exerting in the contemporary world of twilight between peace and war. Another objection to this phrase is that in some parts of the world it has the undesirable aura of discredited imperialism.

In the following sections several modern naval capabilities in the cold war and their relationship to the power spectrum will be examined. The capabilities have been categorized to facilitate discussion, but the continuum of the spectrum should be kept in mind.

Aid to Allies

In this category is placed all military aid to another state short of actually engaging in armed conflict with its enemy. In history this assistance has been very close to actual participation in the hostilities and has

been considered an unfriendly act by the state against which the aid was directed.

Naval capabilities in this category can be subdivided into operations and logistics. Under operations are found: (1) escort of allied shipping and aircraft, (2) reconnaissance and intelligence, (3) the tying down of enemy forces by maneuver and ambiguous intention. The American naval escort provided in 1958 to vessels of the Republic of China sailing to besieged Quemoy was an example of the escort capability. During World War II, prior to American entry, sighting reports by American aircraft of German naval forces were made available to the Royal Navy. The maneuvers conducted by the Italian fleet prior to Italian entry in the war were examples of tying down the fleet of the enemy of an ally. Significantly, a fleet acting in this capacity does not even have to maneuver; all that is necessary is that it be situated adjacent to the enemy's vulnerable areas.

While less dramatic, the logistics aspect of aiding allies has been frequently the more important part of this category. Under this heading would be placed: (1) the training of allied naval personnel, (2) the supply of ships and other naval equipment, ammunition, fuel, provisions, stores, and parts, (3) the usage of bases for repair and maintenance, (4) the transport of supplies and personnel.

The amount of aid, both operational and logistic, rendered in this portion of the spectrum can be graduated

very precisely. Perhaps the classic example of such assistance was the gradual American entry into the Battle of the Atlantic during World War II. While still a non-belligerent the United States undertook the following:

1. Traded to Great Britain, in exchange for base rights in British American possessions, fifty obsolete destroyers.
2. Repaired damaged British warships in U.S. shipyards.
3. Attempted to exclude Axis submarines from waters contiguous to American coasts.
4. Observed and reported movements of German naval forces to Allied authorities.
5. Provided escorts to convoys containing American and Allied ships.

There was a gradual acceleration of aid as the United States became more aware of its danger and committed itself more deeply. In this connection such aid had already brought the United States into a form of undeclared limited war with German naval forces by December 1941.

Police Action

The term police action implies a sanction of society, the purpose of which is to protect that society by restraining a possible offender or subduing an actual offender against the laws of the society. In international relations, the fact that police actions have frequently assumed the characteristics of limited war indicates just how slippery is a clear distinction between the two. The Korean War, although a police action in concept, was in fact a full-grown limited war in its scope. The land aspects of

the Algerian insurrection had the attributes of a limited war; but the French employment of their navy to keep guns from being smuggled to the rebels was in keeping with the police action concept.

Although there is a modern trend towards associating police actions with an act of the international community in keeping with the spirit, if not the word, of the United Nations Charter, it should be remembered that traditionally police actions have been carried out by states against forces in their jurisdiction or sphere of influence and against violators of international law.¹¹ A large portion of the operations of the British Navy between 1815 and 1914 were police actions such as the campaigns in Egypt and the suppression of pirates and slavers.

Naval capabilities as a police power include:

(1) the landing and support of ground forces, (2) some form of blockade, (3) punitive bombardment, (4) seizure of shipping. In recent years police actions have required naval support primarily in landing and supporting ground forces. Although not carried out under United Nations auspices, the landing of United States Marines in Lebanon during the summer of 1958 fell in the police action category and appeared to be in keeping with the United Nations Charter.¹²

¹¹ Pitman B. Potter, "Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing," The American Journal of International Law, LII (October, 1958), 727.

¹² Ibid., 730.

The imposition of a naval blockade is a belligerent right and implies the existence of a state of war.¹³ However, sanctions in the form of a blockade carried out by forces of the United Nations are not considered an act of war.¹⁴ Article 42 of the Charter, in setting forth the action the Security Council may take against aggressors, states: "Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations." Until now the United Nations has instituted only one blockade. In July 1950 a naval blockade was imposed on the area held by the Government of North Korea. With the United Nations enjoying undisputed control of the sea, the blockade was very effective. Significantly, when Communist China entered the Korean War, no similar blockade was proclaimed.

Pacific Blockade "as a means of force short of war, [is] usually differentiated from wartime blockade by not including traffic with the blockaded port by ships of third states, . . ."¹⁵ Although employed by major European powers against states in Latin America and elsewhere during the

¹³U.S., Congress, Senate, Joint Session of Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, Hearings, Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., Part 3, p. 1512.

¹⁴Ibid., 1534.

¹⁵William W. Bishop, Jr., International Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1953), p. 561.

nineteenth century, the use of this sanction appears to be obsolete.¹⁶

Most blockades today are imposed by governments harassed by insurgent forces in areas under the nominal control of the government. These measures are rarely dignified with the word "blockade" (though in fact that is what they are) since to do so would confer belligerent rights on the insurgents. Instead, such subterfuges as "enforcement of customs and trade laws" and "port closure" are used.

Common in preceding centuries, the practice of punitive bombardment of offending cities during peacetime is no longer supported by world opinion or international law. This form of reprisal still takes place occasionally during revolutionary disturbances.

The seizure of foreign vessels on what most nations consider to be the high seas continues to be a feature of international relations. These occurrences are usually the result of differing interpretations as to the extent of territorial waters. However, under some circumstances this reprisal conceivably could be used as a means of exerting pressure in a situation having a different origin.

Military Demonstration

In an analysis of the security implications inherent in the unveiling of new weapons, Bernard Brodie writes:

¹⁶H.A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea (3rd ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 144.

Military demonstrations could conveniently be classified according to objective under two major headings: (a) those intended primarily to convey purpose or intention, and (b) those intended primarily to convey capability. The latter type is generally free of the political risks which often attend the former.¹⁷

Brodie would agree that only rarely are intentions separated from capabilities. Most demonstrations convey liberal portions of both. Brodie's classification is useful insofar as it shows the purpose and flexibility of the demonstration. To simplify examination of this portion of the spectrum, emphasis has been placed on the conveyance of intention and purpose rather than of capability; however, the latter will not be ignored.

For purposes of this study demonstrations are categorized by their use as follows: (1) threat or deterrent to restrain or warn an opponent, (2) indication of friendly support for an ally or neutral.¹⁸ Both of these categories can also convey capability. The use of the demonstration to indicate friendly support has been labeled "salutary presence" and is discussed in the following section as a distinct capability. In this section a military demonstration is defined as the use of military forces to threaten or deter an opponent.

Writers have given various names to demonstrations

¹⁷Bernard Brodie, "Military Demonstrations and Disclosure of New Weapons," World Politics, V (April, 1953), 281.

¹⁸It is possible that a demonstration of support for one country may be interpreted as a threat to another.

used as deterrents and threats. Captain Garrison has called them "orthodox preventive measures."¹⁹ Charles Murphy mentions the "cautioning gesture."²⁰ In his incisive analysis of relations between modern nations, Hans Morgenthau discusses a "policy of prestige."²¹ Since much of Morgenthau's analysis is pertinent to the subject of this chapter, parts of it will be quoted at length.

Relating the policy of prestige to a nation's foreign policy, Morgenthau states:

Whatever the ultimate objectives of a nation's foreign policy, its prestige--its reputation for power--is always an important and sometimes a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of its foreign policy. A policy of prestige is therefore an indispensable element of a rational foreign policy.

Prestige has become particularly important as a political weapon in an age in which the struggle for power is fought not only with the traditional methods of political pressure and military force, but in large measure as a struggle for the minds of men. . . .²²

Relating the prestige policy to the military in general and the navy in particular, he writes:

Besides the practices of diplomacy the policy of prestige uses military demonstration as a means to achieve its purpose. Since military strength is an obvious measure of a nation's power, its demonstration serves to impress others with that nation's power. . . .

Because of the high mobility of navies, which are able to bring the flag and power of a nation to the

¹⁹Daniel J. Garrison, "The Role of the Navy in the Cold War," USNIR, LXXXV (June, 1959), 57.

²⁰Charles J.V. Murphy, "U.S. Sea Power: 'The New Mix,'" Fortune, August, 1959, p. 83.

²¹Morgenthau, 75.

²²Morgenthau, 75.

four corners of the globe, and because of the great impressiveness of their appearance, naval demonstrations have in the past been a favorite instrument of a policy of prestige.²³

Alfred Vagts elaborating further has emphasized the flexibility inherent in the navy as an instrument of foreign policy.

For technical no less than psycho-political reasons, naval forces lend themselves better than military [land] forces to the purposes of a demonstration. For one thing, they are practically always more ready for war than land forces and can set out at very short notice. Their movements can more readily be changed from a peaceful to a hostile character--by diverse announcements--and back again, from routine visits and "showing the flag" as a sign of constant readiness to protect national interests abroad to active interference with guns and landing forces. Their movements can be stopped on short notice and their meanings can be quickly re-interpreted. . . . As a rule, their action does not seem to engage the demonstrating power quite as deeply or irrevocably as a similar use of military [land] forces. . . .²⁴

Assessing the current usefulness of the navy in such support of foreign policy, Captain Garrison maintains:

The silent but meaningful presence of naval forces, capable of employing either conventional or nuclear weapons, of landing assault forces and of remaining indefinitely in the area as completely self-sufficient units has a remarkably stabilizing effect in international affairs.²⁵

Nevertheless, as history amply records, a military demonstration can become a police action or even a limited war under some circumstances. The Battle of Navarino in

²³Morgenthau, 72.

²⁴Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 235.

²⁵Garrison, 60.

1827 and the American intervention in Vera Cruz in 1914 are but two examples of demonstrations that resulted in something much more serious.²⁶

Vagts points out that, "to be demonstrative in character, the actions of armed forces must be clearly visible, pointing in a definite direction for a definite purpose."²⁷ Before the development of radio communications, aircraft and missiles, a naval force to be effective as a threat or deterrent had to be taken to a position in very close proximity to the threatened point. In the Turkish Straits crisis of 1878 the British admiral anchored his fleet in the Sea of Marmora, close ashore, to restrain Russian armies until a political settlement could be worked out. If the British fleet had sailed around the Aegean instead, the Russians might have ignored its presence, even if they had been aware of it.²⁸ Today such close deployment is unnecessary and may be self defeating. If trouble threatened in the Near East or Asia Minor during the 1950's the United States Sixth Fleet merely concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean; its presence was soon felt. When Vagts writes that the demonstration must be "visible" to be effective, he means that in the modern context the presence of the demonstrating force

²⁶ See Vagts, 236-57, for an extended historical treatment of important naval demonstrations conducted from 1845 to 1956.

²⁷ Vagts, 232.

²⁸ Vagts, 240.

and its purpose must be known to the power against which it is directed. The force need not actually be sighted by human eyes, although this is frequently most effective. Press reports, electronic detection, and other intelligence are often adequate to convey information as to the presence of a naval force.

Brodie in his categorization, quoted at the beginning of this section, mentioned a demonstration intended primarily to convey capability. Most of these demonstrations carry distinct overtones of threat or deterrent. As indicated in a previous chapter, the transpolar voyage of the Nautilus could be considered in this category by the Soviet leadership. Besides demonstrating the capability of the Nautilus this voyage demonstrated the vulnerability of Soviet Arctic coasts to penetration by new weapons systems.

Since a demonstration, particularly one used to convey purpose or intention, has heavy psychological overtones, the nation employing it must be careful to use those instruments best suited to take advantage of the behavior patterns of the opponent. This requires adequate imagination and intelligence concerning the propensities of the enemy.

The potential demonstration value will depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the weapons or weapons system in question, on its tactical efficacy, and especially on the pertinence of that efficacy to the entire strategic situation as appreciated by the person towards whom the demonstration is aimed.²⁹

²⁹ Brodie, 299. Emphasis added.

Land-oriented nations have often been acutely aware of any threat to their maritime frontiers--perhaps because buffer states and a large number of army divisions are not suitable for their defense.

Some writers have maintained that demonstrations have lost their utility because of the nature of the Sino-Soviet leadership. This criticism will be discussed and evaluated in Chapter V.

Salutary Presence

Salutary presence is defined here as the use of military forces to impress or indicate friendly support for a foreign power. It is usually an overt manifestation of diplomatic support. Often treated as a part of the military demonstration category, salutary presence differs in degree and somewhat in purpose from a military demonstration.

Paradoxically, salutary presence is more passive and yet more positive than a threat or deterrent. The use of force, while still implicit, is not as menacing as it is in a demonstration. Another important distinction between the demonstration and salutary presence is that in the latter the amount of power (size and strength of forces employed) need not be as large as that required to back up a threat or deterrent.³⁰

³⁰The Russian cruiser Ordzhonikidze was used for the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Great Britain in 1956. By itself this modern cruiser and its escort of two destroyers could not seriously menace the British Isles. Their smart

Closest to the threat in the salutary presence category is the use of a fleet or even individual warships to impress neutrals and potential enemies. "The periodical dispatch, on the part of the great maritime powers, of naval squadrons to the ports of the Far East demonstrated to the people of that region the superiority of Western Power."³¹

Although the exercises and maneuvers carried out jointly by allied powers usually have as their primary objective increased military efficiency and tactical coordination, often these operations are undertaken for a political purpose. The usual political purpose is to indicate friendly support of the allies for one another and the viability and solidarity of the alliance. Insofar as the maneuvers have these objectives, they are being used to implement the salutary presence capability. Such operations may, of course, be used to impress neutrals or potential enemies, or even as a military demonstration to deter or threaten an opponent. Although less mobile and flexible in this respect, land forces can also be used to implement salutary presence in some situations. Perhaps a classic example is the West's employment of its garrison in Berlin.

appearance and handling, however, did impress observers and demonstrate Russian naval capabilities. It is interesting to speculate what the effect would have been if the Ordzhonikidze had been escorted by two modern missile submarines instead of the two destroyers.

³¹Morgenthau, 72.

When in the course of exercising the salutary presence capability a warship or naval force puts into a friendly port, their stay is usually termed a "good will visit." Obviously, the use of the most modern and diversified equipment is highly desirable in these visits to most dramatically convey capability as well as intention.

Assuming that ports are to be visited, a condition limiting the flexibility of this part of the spectrum is that permission must be obtained diplomatically from the host nation. Prior to seeking this permission, the political effects of the visit on the host nation must be ascertained by the visitor insofar as possible.³² Large-scale visits by naval forces of the Western Powers to neutralist states recently freed from colonial status have been very limited since 1945. As indicated previously, naval forces in years past have been the instrument of the leading colonial powers.

The naval capability in the salutary presence category is unique. A naval squadron, or even a single ship, can on invitation present itself in a port without intruding on the hospitality of the host by requiring barracks and airfields or by flying over his countryside. An anchorage is all that is necessary. After a few days the ships are

³²Incidents have occurred where, after the host-state has approved a visit, the visiting ships and liberty parties have been made the object of demonstrations carried out by elements in opposition to the government in power.

zone; its stay was not long enough to wear out the welcome. There were no "army of occupation" complications; "nor does their presence leave quite such a deep impression on the collective memory as military enterprise of a similar intent--it seems to vanish like the tracks ships draw in the water."³³ Naval power is visible; but it is not imposed on the countryside. It is adjacent to the state visited, but not necessarily in or over it.³⁴ This gives the modern navy a remarkable flexibility in implementing degrees of "presence."

A collateral advantage that the local merchant appreciates is that the liberty parties coming ashore are usually well paid by local standards (and free spending by any standard!). The people-to-people aspects of good will visits are seldom ignored. Local charities are frequently given considerable assistance.

Politico-Humanitarian Assistance

Many would maintain that humanitarian assistance hardly comes under the heading of a power capability. Some would say that the sole reason for rendering humanitarian assistance to another nation is altruism. Certainly, people

³³Vagts, 235.

³⁴The modern navy, too, can exert power in and over an adjacent land area through its air and marine components. The display of such power, however, is not the sine qua non of its presence. This is an option not available to armies and land-based air forces.

everywhere are becoming more acutely aware of conditions of human suffering in other parts of the world, no matter what the cause. By providing humanitarian and charitable support a nation can demonstrate its genuine interest in the well-being of other less fortunate nations. However, it cannot be denied that there is at least a political by-product. Aid of this type is a manifestation of enlightened self-interest. After reciting a list of humanitarian services rendered to other nations by the U.S. Navy during the cold war, Captain Carrison writes: "Missions of this kind support U.S. cold war policies and promote international good-will."³⁵

Men's minds can be won by acts of kindness or assistance in spite of the real motives that may prompt such action. The cold war has been and will be won and lost in the minds of men. The purists may deplore this seemingly "perverted" altruism, but the fact remains that such assistance is a means of exerting power, albeit an indirect one. That this is so can be seen in the sometimes frantic race the Soviet colonial empire and the free world run in trying to render assistance to needy nations. Care is usually taken to see that such efforts are adequately publicized.

Clearly, this category can shade into the salutary presence portion of the spectrum, or, indeed, be identical with it. More than one good will visit has blossomed into extensive disaster assistance.

³⁵Carrison, 61. Emphasis added.

Armed forces, in spite of the requirements of their calling, have throughout modern history rendered various humanitarian services whenever possible. Insofar as these acts have won allies, gained the admiration of neutrals or won the respect of enemies, they have been acts of power. The modern navy is well suited to carrying out the humanitarian mission. Its capabilities with power implications include: relocation of refugees, relief of stricken areas in case of disaster--whether natural or man-made--and aid to mariners in distress.

The relocation of refugees can be highly political in its effects. This is a point on which the Soviet colonial empire is very sensitive. The evacuation of refugees from North Korea, together with United Nations forces, in late 1950 was an act of humanity because of its political overtones. This evacuation dramatized the free choice of the Korean people in casting their lot with the South Korean and United Nations forces. In a similar manner the later evacuation of civilians from North Viet Nam had well-publicized cold war political implications. Such relocation tasks are, to a great extent, made possible only by the availability of adequate well-trained amphibious forces and sea-lift capacity. Naval forces are usually the only elements equipped to execute this task rapidly on a truly large scale.³⁶

³⁶The Viet Nameese "Freedom Lift," also called the

In relieving areas suffering from disaster, the helicopter has made an outstanding contribution in reaching sites formerly inaccessible to naval forces.³⁷ The modern navy's self-contained medical and rescue organization has few equals in taking disaster problems in hand.

The effect of such assistance in building good will and respect is difficult to assess. But usually the assisting service receives praise in the local press and invariably official expressions of gratitude are received through diplomatic channels.³⁸

Humanitarian assistance, as a portion of the power spectrum, is opportunistic and can be followed as a deliberate policy only insofar as a state is constantly prepared and equipped to render it. Imagination and initiative are required for effective results. When used in this manner, it has been a powerful weapon in the war for the mind of man. The modern navy by virtue of its mobility, flexibility and self-contained array of services has been admirably suited for this task.

"Passage to Freedom," is described infra, pp. 71-73. It is interesting to speculate on the size of the airlift required to duplicate this accomplishment. As it was, the task was completed by a relatively small U.S. amphibious force supplemented by MSTS vessels.

³⁷The U.S. Navy's contribution to the relief of the Tampico (September, 1955) and Ceylon (January, 1958) disasters are informative in this respect.

³⁸For a survey of letters of thanks and official statements of gratitude, see: U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Information, U.S. Navy Disaster Relief: Effectiveness in Improving International Relations, August 6, 1959.

Conclusion

From this brief analysis of the spectrum of naval capabilities it is apparent that the navy of the cold war era remains the handmaiden of diplomacy and national policy. The wide range and precise gradations of power which the modern navy can exert have been useful to the statesmen of the free world who must meet a variety of challenges and take advantage of diverse opportunities with the most suitable instrument. The statesman serving a country with a well-balanced modern navy enjoys a greater measure of flexibility in posing challenges to and meeting threats by his less fortunate opponent.

Though important, the navy is only one of the instruments of the statesman. While it can play a fine solo in skilled hands, its greatest effectiveness is realized when it is skillfully co-ordinated with the other instruments of the national policy "orchestra." It is the task of the statesman to measure out the correct admixture to gain the effect desired. To achieve this effect an understanding of the navy's capabilities is essential.³⁹

³⁹For one diplomat's views on the capabilities and political suitability of naval forces, see Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), pp. 2, 4 (favorable) and pp. 29-35 (critical).

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1943-60

It is not enough that the Pacific Fleet be prepared to prosecute all kinds of limited wars or to continue to protect the peace by its deterrent powers. This magnificent force of officers, men and equipment must make significant contributions in blunting the diverse and determined attacks which the Communists launch daily against the Free World in this protracted conflict.¹

This chapter deals with commitments in the form of naval operations made by the United States in support of its foreign policy in Southeast Asia in the years since the end of World War II. Without going into considerable operational detail an endeavor will be made to demonstrate the manner in which the Navy has played its part in carrying out American foreign policy.

Rather than give a chronological résumé of these commitments, the conceptual framework of the previous chapter will be utilized. That is, operations with a similar objective will be grouped together and described as integral parts of the power spectrum. This approach will facilitate the evaluation of the Navy's contribution, which is the subject of the final chapter of this study.

¹Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to all flag and commanding officers, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Subject: "The Pacific Fleet and the Cold War." April 29, 1959.

No attempt will be made to describe or to give a complete record of every operation conducted by the Navy in Southeast Asia waters since 1945. Those operations that will be included comprise a representative cross section of missions given to the U.S. Pacific Fleet during the past fifteen years.

Aid to Allies

Military assistance has been extended by the United States to most of the states of Southeast Asia since the end of World War II. For the most part this assistance has been given to those states with which the United States has collective security treaties. Limited aid has been given to some few other states.

Logistic Support

Most of the aid given in Southeast Asia by the United States has been in the form of logistic support through the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Inasmuch as this study is concerned with naval operations, MAP aid will not be discussed.² Of interest in this section is the

²This should not obscure the fact that such aid has considerable influence on what part of the power spectrum the statesman chooses to employ. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles W. Shuff, testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, stated:

"For example in Quemoy [1958], . . . free world interests were ably defended by MAP-supported forces, backed by U.S. forces. We were given time, as the situation became clearer, to see how much force was needed; to arrange with our allies to apply that much

logistic support rendered to the allies of the United States through the operations of the Pacific Fleet.

On two important occasions since the end of World War II elements of the Pacific Fleet have been called upon to exercise their logistic support capability in Southeast Asia. The first was during the famous "Passage to Freedom" from North Viet Nam after the truce in Indo-China which was concluded during the summer of 1954. The objectives of this operation have been summarized by Rear Admiral L.S. Sabin, the officer in tactical command.

A great many factors underlay the U.S. decision to provide shipping to assist in the evacuation of North Viet Nam in implementation of the Geneva Conference Agreement of 21 July 1954. These factors, existing against a background of almost certain inadequacy of available French shipping formed the basis for the determination of the mission of Task Force 90 [the American force conducting the evacuation] shipping deployed in Indo-China waters and of CTF 90. Briefly they may be set down:

(1) The humanitarian desire to provide transportation for those civilian residents of North Viet Nam who desired to live under the government of South Viet Nam rather than the Viet Minh conquerors and who otherwise might not be able to achieve this goal.

(2) The desire to prevent military equipment, most important military equipment purchased through U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds, from falling into the hands of the Viet Minh.

(3) The desire to demonstrate to the people the U.S. determination to assist them in combatting and escaping Communism wherever it appeared.

(4) The need to maintain close liaison with French

force and no more. . . . Since the issue could be decided without recourse to more force than our allies could deliver, the interests of world security and peace were best served."

U.S., Congress, House, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1470.

and Viet Namee authorities in order to accomplish the above aims.³

By mid-1955 the evacuation had been completed. American naval forces had evacuated 310,848 people, 68,757 tons of supplies and 8,135 vehicles.⁴ The American force accomplishing this sizeable task was small but obviously effective. It was comprised for the most part of amphibious elements regularly deployed in the Western Pacific.⁵ The troop-carrying capacity of these forces well-suited them to the task of refugee evacuation. The humanitarian aspects of this operation were many, as is apparent from Admiral Sabin's letter. These aspects will be discussed further in a subsequent section.

A second occasion calling for the exercise of this capability was the Tachen crisis of February 1955. After the Communist Chinese capture of the small island of Yiki-angshan in the Tachen Group, increased Communist pressure made necessary the Nationalist withdrawal from the remainder of the islands in the group.⁶ Because of the location of

³Letter from the Commander of Amphibious Group One to the Chief of Naval Operations, June 15, 1955.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶There is some basis for the belief that the islands could have been held if the United States had been willing to commit its forces to their defense. The Tachens were no closer to Communist gun positions than Quemoy which is to this day held by Nationalist forces. However, President Eisenhower decided that the islands were not vital to the

the islands off the coast of Chekiang Province, some two hundred miles from Taiwan and literally under Communist guns, the troop-lift capacity of the Nationalist Navy was both insufficient in size and inadequately protected to effect the withdrawal without unacceptable losses.

President Eisenhower made the decision to assist the Nationalist Government in withdrawing its forces from the islands. As a result, strong American naval forces were assembled in the seas north of Taiwan.⁷ The American amphibious forces assisting in the Viet Nameese "Freedom Lift" were temporarily deployed northward to assist other units in the evacuation.⁸ Covered by the biggest concentration of American naval power since the Inchon landing in 1950, United States and Chinese Nationalist ships ferried the garrison, together with the entire civil population of the islands, to Taiwan.⁹ In all 28,500 persons and 40,000 tons of military equipment were evacuated.¹⁰

defense of Taiwan. Without American assistance the islands were untenable and the Chinese government on Taiwan decided to evacuate them. U.S. News and World Report, January 28, 1955, p. 22.

⁷In all some 132 American and 27 Nationalist war-ships participated in the evacuation. This force included a U.S. covering unit of 5 attack carriers, 6 cruisers, and 50 destroyers. New York Times, February 13, 1955, p. 3, and U.S. News and World Report, February 4, 1955, p. 23.

⁸Time, February 21, 1955, p. 3.

⁹New York Times, February 13, 1955, p. E 1.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 3.

While the number of personnel evacuated from the Tachens was insignificant when measured against the quantitative accomplishments of the "Freedom Lift," the former operation was carried out under more demanding conditions. In the Tachens there was the constant risk of armed Communist interference; indeed, one American aircraft strayed off course and was shot down by Communist anti-aircraft batteries. In many respects the Tachen evacuation was similar to the Hungnam redeployment of the Korean War. In both cases amphibious forces worked under combat conditions while covered by a powerful escort.

Operational Support

Information on this subject remains classified for the most part and any exposition will necessarily be based heavily on implication and surmise. However, one concrete example of such support was the escort provided by elements of the Seventh Fleet to Nationalist vessels supplying Quemoy during the 1958 crisis. On that occasion American escorts conveyed Nationalist supply vessels to within three miles of the besieged islands.¹¹

American naval patrol aircraft have long conducted surveillance flights along the Chinese coast, outside the twelve mile limit.¹² It appears certain that the United

¹¹U.S. News and World Report, September 19, 1958, pp. 31-32.

¹²The United States does not recognize the Communist

States has shared some, if not all, of this operational intelligence with the Nationalist Navy on an exchange basis.¹³

Before leaving the subject of aid to allies, it would be well to point out that the mere presence of American naval forces in the vicinity of Taiwan has been to some extent operational support insofar as it has inhibited any Communist attempts at invasion of Nationalist-held islands. This subject will be discussed more fully when military demonstrations are examined.

Police Actions

No clearly defined police actions on the order of the Korean War, or even of the Lebanon landings, have been undertaken by the United States in Southeast Asia since the end of World War II. One operation that might be put in this category was the Hainan incident of July 26, 1954, in which two Chinese Communist aircraft were shot down while

Bloc's delimitation of territorial waters at twelve miles. Apparently the flights have been conducted at a minimum distance of twelve miles to minimize any alleged "provocation." For the importance attached to the twelve mile line off the Chinese coast by one American tactical commander, see: Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1956), p. 50.

¹³ Admiral Felix B. Stump's (Commander in Chief, Pacific Area) answer to a reporter's question is revealing for what is not said on this subject.

Question: "Is there anything to the Communist charge that American aircraft spot ships heading for Communist ports for the benefit of the Chinese Nationalists?"

Answer: "We conduct patrols over seas of the ocean in which we have an interest."

U.S. News and World Report, August 27, 1954, p. 24.

attacking American aircraft. The American aircraft were engaged in a search for survivors from a British airliner shot down by the Chinese Communists three days previously.¹⁴ However, this operation was in the nature of humanitarian assistance and the police action required was incidental to the accomplishment of the task given the search force.¹⁵

Military Demonstrations

Since the Communist triumph in China, military demonstrations, as defined in Chapter III, by United States naval forces have been an integral part of the international scene in Southeast Asia. Several of these operations will be described in the following sub-sections.

Indo-China

During the siege of Dienbienphu in April 1954, an American naval force carried out a demonstration off the coast of Indo-China.

" . . . Two U.S. aircraft carriers, the Boxer and Philippine Sea, steamed towards the South China Sea from the Philippines. . . . It was the classic show of force, designed both to deter any Red Chinese attack on Viet Nam and to provide weapons for instant retaliation should it prove necessary."¹⁶

¹⁴Brittin, 50.

¹⁵Note that American naval forces were still operating in waters adjacent to Indo-China during the week after the Geneva Conference.

¹⁶James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, January 16, 1956, p. 71.

One observer maintained that the United States was considering the possibility of intervening in the Indo-China conflict and that the naval forces were moved into position to be ready to implement such a decision.¹⁷ The possibility of intervention is, of course, explicit in a demonstration. Such intervention was never undertaken by American forces.¹⁸

Later on June 27, 1954, during the Geneva Conference on Indo-Chinese problems the force returned to the waters adjacent to northern Indo-China. As previously noted, this force was still in those waters on July 26th, almost a week after the end of the conference. Both of these deployments of American naval forces were officially considered "part of normal Navy precautions in an emergency that could affect U.S. interests."¹⁹

Taiwan

In several respects President Truman's neutralization of Taiwan on June 27, 1950, was a continuing military demonstration. The explicit executor of this decision was

¹⁷Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," Reporter, September 14, 1954, pp. 31-34.

¹⁸Allegedly, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff made Allied, principally British, support the sine qua non of intervention. The British Government allegedly declined to support such action. Ibid.

¹⁹U.S. News and World Report, August 6, 1954, p. 23. This is a good illustration of Vagts' statement that naval movements can "readily be changed from a peaceful to a hostile character--by diverse announcements--and back again, . . . Their movements can be stopped on short notice and their meanings can be quickly reinterpreted." Vagts, 235.

the Seventh Fleet. In practice, this mission required the interposition of U.S. naval forces between Taiwan and the mainland of China. Although the Chinese Communists had started to mount an invasion before the deployment of elements of the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait,²⁰ significantly none was attempted afterwards.

The Fleet's mission underwent a fundamental modification in February 1953 when President Eisenhower "issued instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China." The other half of President Truman's directive to the Seventh Fleet--to prevent any attack on Taiwan--was retained by President Eisenhower. In essence the Fleet was used to insure a sheltered sanctuary (for Nationalist operations against the mainland) similar to that enjoyed by the Communists in Manchuria during the Korean War.

From late June 1950 until the autumn of 1954 American naval strength in the Strait was very modest. It usually consisted of a destroyer division, a seaplane tender,

²⁰In early 1950, after their invasion of Hainan, the Chinese Communists massed their forces on the coasts of Fukien and Chekiang Provinces allegedly for the invasion of Taiwan. It is estimated that as many as 100,000 of these troops contracted an incapacitating disease caused by a blood fluke which was ingested during amphibious exercises. The problems induced by an epidemic of such magnitude allegedly frustrated Communist efforts to mount an invasion of Taiwan. Frank A. Kierman, Jr., "The Blood Fluke That Saved Formosa," Harpers, April, 1959, pp. 45-47, and Harold C. Hinton, "China," Major Governments of Asia, ed. George M. Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 56.

and a squadron or two of naval patrol aircraft. These units formed a surveillance net that could be reinforced rapidly by other elements of the Seventh Fleet.

In the winter of 1954-55, during the Tachen evacuation, this force was greatly augmented by the striking power of several task groups, including famous Task Force Seventy-seven composed of attack carriers and their escorts. In spite of poor weather conditions existing then, many American naval units participating in the operation were clearly visible from Communist gun positions. Chinese Communist forces made no attempt to interfere with the evacuation.

A subsequent crisis occurred during the summer of 1958 when it appeared that Peiping might attempt to take advantage of the world's pre-occupation with the Lebanon landing to gobble up the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.²¹ The Navy's participation in the Lebanon landings is well known. Shortly after the Navy had exercised its police action capability in the Levant, it was called upon to use its demonstration capability in the Far East. The Pacific Fleet was rapidly put on a war-time footing and a major portion of it was assembled in the Formosa Strait.²²

²¹The best description of the Navy's participation in the Quemoy "showdown" is contained in Charles Murphy's "U.S. Sea Power: 'The New Mix,'" Fortune, August, 1959, pp. 83, 180-87. Much of the information in this article is not available from any other non-classified source.

²²American naval forces eventually included some 6 carriers, 3 cruisers, 50 destroyers, 9 submarines and 600 aircraft. Murphy, 184.

As indicated previously in this chapter American naval forces escorted Nationalist Chinese vessels to within three miles of Quemoy. The most valuable contribution of the Navy, however, was the great strength and proximity of the fast carrier strike forces. Although subjecting the islands to heavy bombardment, the Chinese Communists did not attempt to conduct an invasion nor directly attack United States forces.

Peiping had endeavored to capitalize on the American commitment in the Mediterranean by subjecting a weak point in the containment barrier to great military and political pressure.²³ Apparently the Chinese Communists felt that pressure on such a great scale would result in another Tachen-like retreat. In this they were disappointed. Sea power had given the United States the option as to where to withdraw and where to stand firm.

While demonstrating its purpose and intention off Quemoy, the U.S. Navy also demonstrated its capability to the Chinese Communists.

There was a good deal of astute gamesmanship in the manner in which U.S. power was manipulated so as to make its weight known to the adversary, yet not provoke him into a clash. U.S. policy was to let Chiang carry the battle. . . . With the idea of apprising the Reds

²³The political pressure came both from Communist China and the Soviet Union. Further, the allies of the United States were extremely reluctant about being placed in a position in which they would be committed to defend the offshore islands if the Chinese Communists attacked them. Drew Middleton, "China Policy: Seen by Our Allies," New York Times, September 14, 1958, Sec. IV, p. 5.

that much better equipment was being held back, Beakley [Commander of the Seventh Fleet operating off Taiwan] kept his fastest fighters . . . flashing over the Straits, at an altitude where they were certain to register a thought-provoking impression on Red radar screens.²⁴

Another method used to convey capability was the equipping of Chiang's obsolescent fighters with the deadly Navy-developed "sidewinder" missile; this missile gave the superb Nationalist pilots an edge over their otherwise better-equipped adversaries.

Salutary Presence

In the first few years following World War II American naval power receded from Southeast Asia. U.S. naval forces in the Far East were concentrated primarily in Japanese home waters and in North China. Appearances by American warships in Southeast Asia were on a limited scale and were confined to a few good will visits and special diplomatic missions. These appearances are classified as salutary presence inasmuch as they were carried out in order to indicate United States support of the countries of the area.

A successful example of such presence was the visit of a six ship task force, including a cruiser and a carrier, to the Philippines in July of 1947 in connection with the first anniversary of Philippine Independence Day.²⁵ A

²⁴Murphy, 184.

²⁵U.S., Department of the Navy, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1948, p. 8.

somewhat similar mission to Indo-China was less satisfactory! In March 1950 two American destroyers steamed into Saigon to indicate American support of the French-backed Bao Dai regime.²⁶ The result was a well-organized riot in the streets of the city led by Viet Minh elements and their adherents.

A more unusual mission was that given Kenville, an attack transport vessel, during the winter of 1947-48. In co-operation with the United Nations, the United States furnished this vessel to act as neutral "ground" in the harbor of Batavia (now Djakarta) for the U.N. fact-finders investigating the Indonesian insurrection.²⁷

With the fall of China to the Communists, the start of the Korean War, and the neutralization of the Formosa Strait by Presidential Order, American naval power began to reappear in strength in Southeast Asian waters. With the end of the Korean War, the focus of American naval operations shifted southward to an even greater degree. The ports of U.S. allies were visited frequently. They included Bangkok, Manila, Singapore, Hong Kong, Chilung and Saigon.²⁸ With few exceptions the ports of the newly independent, and in the main politically uncommitted, nations were not

²⁶Ellen J. Hammer, The Conflict in Indo-China (Stanford Univ. Press, 1954), p. 271.

²⁷Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1948, p. 9.

²⁸John V. Noel, "Showing the Flag in Southeast Asia," USNIP, LXXXI (February, 1955), 179-91.

visited. The calls of American vessels in Ceylon in 1958 and India and Burma in 1959 seemed to presage more frequent visits to the uncommitted nations of Southeast Asia in the years to come.

Although the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was ratified in February 1955, the first joint maneuvers of the forces of the signatory states were not held until March 1956. This operation, called "Firmlink," was to be the forerunner of many others; several exercises were held annually in succeeding years. In these joint operations naval co-ordination was usually the chief military objective.

The substantial American contribution to these exercises tended to emphasize the American commitment to support its allies in Southeast Asia. Western, and specifically American, presence in Southeast Asia has been the subject of considerable criticism from the uncommitted nations in and adjacent to the region. This criticism is evaluated in Chapter V.

Politico-Humanitarian Assistance

Since 1945 the U.S. Navy has rendered a considerable amount of humanitarian assistance in the Far East, much of it in Southeast Asia. The most spectacular example of such aid was the "Passage to Freedom" in Viet Nam previously described. This operation combined aid to an ally with humanitarian assistance. The humanitarian and political

objectives of the "Passage to Freedom" are obvious in Admiral Sabin's letter, previously quoted.²⁹ The operation received wide publicity throughout the non-Communist world.

Although not occurring in Southeast Asia proper, assistance rendered to Ceylon by American naval forces during January 1958 was widely covered by the press of Southeast Asia.³⁰ On this occasion a U.S. aircraft carrier and two destroyers, loaded with helicopters, food and medical supplies, made a fast voyage from Manila to flood-stricken and disease-threatened Ceylon.³¹ The Governor General of Ceylon, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, wrote the American ambassador:

The people of Ceylon and I are deeply grateful to your Government, Admiral Briggs [the American officer commanding the task unit rendering the assistance], yourself and all others of your country who so readily came to our assistance in our time of need. We were amazed at the speed and efficiency with which the aid was rendered.³²

A large section of Southeast Asia depends on the sea directly for its livelihood. Other parts are tied to the sea indirectly since maritime transport provides the only

²⁹Supra, pp. 72-73.

³⁰U.S. Navy Disaster Relief, pp. 8-12.

³¹Elward F. Baldrige, "Politico-Military Policy in Today's Navy," USNIP, LXXXV (March, 1959), 31-35. This article presents a lucid description of the policy considerations involved in rendering humanitarian assistance. The operation in Ceylon, briefly described here, was used as a case study.

³²U.S. Navy Disaster Relief, p. 7.

access to markets. The frequent tropical storms and the small size of the vessels used in commerce and fishing in the region combine to make nautical mishaps and disasters a frequent occurrence. As a result of its widespread deployment throughout East Asia the U.S. Navy has been often the first on the scene to render aid.³³

There are many other examples of the types of humanitarian assistance given by the Navy in Southeast Asian waters since 1945. The search for survivors of a British airliner shot down by Chinese Communist aircraft has been described previously. Another example occurred after the war in late 1945 and early 1946 when American naval amphibious craft carried food supplies to outlying islands in the Philippines and brought their copra to market.³⁴

Conclusion

East Asia since 1945 has been the setting of the sharpest clashes between the free world and the Soviet colonial empire. Because it is, perhaps, the principal battleground on which the cold war has been and is being fought, and because of its geography and political dynamism, Southeast Asia represents a decisive area in which to evaluate the utility of the naval power spectrum in the contemporary

³³U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Information, An Outline Report on Missions of Mercy by the U.S. Navy, January, 1952, to July, 1959, August 6, 1959, pp. 1-9.

³⁴Truman, I, 468-69.

world. This evaluation is the subject of the final chapter of this study.

CHAPTER V

EVALUATION OF THE NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION

. . . The ability of the U.S. and the Western nations in general to command and use the sea routes will at once appear as a great asset--but like most assets of value only if it can be invested in conjunction with others--and in accordance with some well defined purpose.¹

In this chapter an endeavor will be made to synthesize the elements of the previous three chapters in order to arrive at an evaluation of the Navy's role in U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia since 1945. The components presented in the previous chapters have been objectives, capabilities and commitments respectively. As indicated in Chapter I, the central purpose of this study is to evaluate naval commitments supporting foreign policy objectives against a yardstick of naval capabilities. Before undertaking this task these components, which were defined in Chapter I, should be related to one another.

The Relationship of Objectives, Capabilities and Commitments

Admiral Robert Carney, while Chief of Naval Operations, wrote: "If one were to risk an all-inclusive definition of national policy, it might be said that it represents

¹Walter Millis, "Sea Power: Abstraction or Asset?" Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April, 1951), 375.

the sum-total of national aspirations balanced against national capabilities."² When put in operational form, aspirations become objectives. To be realistic the commitments undertaken by a state must strike a balance between these objectives and the means available to realize them. Admiral Burke, Admiral Carney's successor as Chief of Naval Operations, put it this way:

Relationships between foreign policy objectives and military capabilities are inseparable. Foreign policy considerations sometimes prevent military leaders from carrying out a strategic plan they think is most appropriate. But conversely, if the military lacks certain capabilities--if it is not able to provide just the right degree of force at the right time--then the makers of foreign policy are seriously hampered in their efforts as well.³

Feliks Gross makes the same point when he writes: "It is rather easy to design objectives of foreign policy; it is, however, difficult to enforce policies. The latter requires material and immaterial factors."⁴ Capabilities, then, are the limiting factors in the formulation of realistic objectives.

Commitments, as elements of policy, are undertaken to realize objectives. They are inclusive of capabilities inasmuch as a meaningful commitment cannot normally exceed

²Robert B. Carney, "The Principles of Sea Power," USNIP, LXXIX (August, 1953), 818.

³CNO Shop Talk: A Personal Message to All U.S. Naval Officers, November 9, 1959.

⁴Gross, 94.

a capability.⁵ On the other hand, a commitment is significantly related to the objective. The size of the commitment is adjusted to reflect the importance of an objective and the relative difficulty in achieving it.⁶ The commitment, then, is limited by maximum capability and by the nature of the objective.

At this point it should be said that the objective by its very nature may lie beyond the capability of any one instrument of national power; no realistic commitment of any one instrument may be sufficient to achieve the objective. However, a combination of commitments by the various instruments of national power may place the objective within the realm of national capability. The fact that such a mixture is often necessary in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives greatly increases the difficulty of evaluating the techniques of foreign policy. Insofar as possible in the evaluations attempted in this chapter, an effort has been made to separate those results for which the Navy is primarily responsible from those achieved principally by other instruments of national power.

Naval Power and Containment

During the fifteen years covered by this study the

⁵A commitment cannot usefully be employed as a bluff although a specific maneuver to carry out a commitment may be used in such a manner.

⁶Kissinger, 189.

United States was the world's leading naval power. Anything within the capabilities of modern naval forces could have been accomplished by the United States. Naval capabilities were seldom fully exploited because other considerations, usually political, were dominant. For example, during the Korean War the United States had the capability to conduct a naval blockade of Communist China. This capability was not exercised because of the opposition of the U.N. allies of the United States.⁷ Thus any evaluation of the naval contribution, or possible contribution, to the execution of American foreign policy must be carried out within the larger political frame of reference.

Although sometimes obscured by references to "roll-back" or "liberation," the primary American security objective since 1947 has been the containment of the Soviet colonial empire. Until 1950 no determined effort was made to implement this objective in Southeast Asia. In the immediate post-war years American naval power in Asian waters was smaller in some respects than it had been in pre-war days when the U.S. Asiatic Fleet operated from Cavite and Olongapo in the Philippines. With the fall of China to the Communists in 1949 and the Korean War which broke out the following year the United States was forced to implement its containment policy in Asia in fact as well as in theory.

⁷Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East, 1759.

Subsequent to 1950 whenever a state in Asia chose to remain independent, it did so because its friends controlled the adjacent seas and demonstrated a willingness to come to its aid if that independence were threatened. However, if a people were deluded by an indigenous leadership controlled by a foreign state, American naval power could do little to remedy the situation without doing violence to American principles. A case in point occurred in Indo-China in 1954.

In Indo-China the democratic elements were caught between Communism and colonialism. The people had experienced colonialism while Communism had become identified with independence. The people of North Viet Nam chose, or at least accepted, a new indigenous leadership and rejected the old colonial status (no matter how modernized and refurbished). The possibility that many of the new leaders were the tools of a foreign power was either immaterial, unknown, or discovered too late.

Under these circumstances American naval power was powerless to save the Viet Minh-infested northern part of Indo-China from Communist seizure. The value of the American naval demonstrations in 1954 is problematical.⁸ Whether a strike by carrier-based aviation would have saved Dien-bienphu must remain an unanswered question. But, this much seems sure: such a strike in support of French forces would have appeared to Asians everywhere as an attempt

⁸This point is discussed further infra, pp. 101-103.

on the part of the United States to re-impose a colonial regime on a people fighting for their independence. Probably, in the long run, American objectives in Indo-China were best served by not utilizing maximum naval capabilities to attempt to retrieve a poor military and a worse political situation.

Containment, to be effective in Southeast Asia, has required that the people of the region have approximately the same image of ultimate Communist intentions as do those states that by experience are more familiar with the Communist threat. This means that the United States has had to seize every opportunity to show the true nature and ultimate intentions of Communism to the peoples of Southeast Asia.

Attitudes Towards Sea Power in Southeast Asia

Any evaluation of the effectiveness of naval power in a given area must consider the attitudes of its inhabitants towards sea power. This is particularly important under conditions of cold war when the psychological significance of modern weapons and their employment is very great.

A careful look at the geography of Southeast Asia explains better than any words the importance of sea power in controlling such an area. The only vital transportation medium is shipping. Without it, or denied its use, the economy of the region would grind to a halt and many of its people would face famine. Even the mainland areas are, in effect, islands since there are few significant

international land transport routes. Professor Buss writes of Southeast Asia:

The continental countries are separated from the rest of Asia by magnificent mountain barriers, and their internal communications are often difficult because of jungles, malarial swamps, or rugged peaks. Where the lands divide, the seas unite. Every type of ship--from the Arab sails and the Chinese junks to modern luxury liners --ply from port to port.⁹

The Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia in World War II was made possible only by their control of the seas. Allied naval forces were their primary target from the first minute of the war--at Pearl Harbor in 1941--until the last gasp of the kamikazi attacks--off Okinawa in 1945. Only after the Allied naval forces had been destroyed, dispersed, or neutralized could the Japanese conduct their invasion of Southeast Asia and maintain their control thereafter. As Japanese naval power crumbled subsequent to the summer of 1944, Japan's grasp on Southeast Asia withered. This lesson has not been lost on Asians.

Memories are long in the Far East. The Asians well remember World War II. They remember that their countries were lost to the enemy. They remember too that their countries were redeemed, via the sea.

These people understand the vital nature of sea power. It is not just the rulers or the leaders that do; it is the man in the street, the business man, and the coolie.

Very few of them know theory, but they know this: when the seas around them are controlled by themselves or their friends, their countries live in honor. When the seas around them are controlled by enemies, their nations fall and they are run by a foreign power.

It is as simple as that, and they understand it

⁹ Southeast Asia and the World Today, p. 9.

well. They understand it because they learned it the hard way, the very hard way.¹⁰

The "long memories," to which Admiral Burke referred, are also aware of the fact that Western sea power had penetrated the region and set up empires and spheres of influence long before the Japanese had arrived on the scene during World War II. China and Southeast Asia were continuously victimized by Western sea power until well into the twentieth century.

From the point of view of nationalists in contemporary Asia, the waters surrounding them have been held by "friendly powers" only too rarely. The seas did bring the invader; but during the past 400 years the invader has been the West. While there is a growing awareness among free Asians of the importance of American control of the seas to their independence, cognizance should be taken of the Asian's traditional distrust of Western sea-borne power. Sea power, and specifically naval power, has been in years past the handmaiden of imperialism. This association of navies with imperialism is doubly unfortunate today when the chief threat to the independence of Southeast Asian countries comes from a land power. The naval power of the free world, in attempting to bolster a vulnerable area, has been saddled with the albatross of an unfortunate past.

Happily, the very flexibility of naval power gives

¹⁰Admiral Burke, speaking before the Newspaper Editors Luncheon, Minneapolis, Minnesota, July 18, 1959.

its possessors a way in which to moderate the rigors of this dilemma. Naval power, the mailed fist and velvet glove of sea power, can exert its pressures in such ways as to keep the sensitive nationalist's distrust at a minimum while achieving the objective of frustrating the will of the aggressor. No method presently available can both accomplish this objective and completely eliminate the rabid nationalist's distrust. The unique flexibility possessed by the Navy gives the United States significant advantages in its efforts to defend Southeast Asia from Communist military aggression. To a lesser extent the Navy also gives the United States some measure of flexibility in dealing with Communist political, i.e. subversive, encroachment.

Evaluation of the Naval Power Spectrum

There are two possible criteria by which one might measure the "success" of a technique of foreign policy. The first is to compare the actual results with the objectives that were initially stipulated; failure to reach a charted goal would thus mean that the technique proved unsuccessful. On the other hand, one may measure the difference between the overall policy situation at the moment the technique is invoked and the situation afterward. If the state's position, on balance, is improved (and the improvement is due to the new technique), it is possible to claim success.¹¹

In the evaluation to follow, the latter criterion has been employed where possible. Each portion of the power

¹¹Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "The United States, Great Britain, and SEATO: A Case Study in Fait Accompli," Journal of Politics, XVIII (August, 1956), 459.

spectrum will be examined in turn. Evaluation will be limited to those operations described in Chapter IV.

Aid to Allies

The twin objectives of all American military assistance to states in Southeast Asia have been to help them defend themselves against aggression and to help them man their portion of the free world's defense perimeter. The former objective has been explicit while the latter has been implicit. Often the two have been identical. Most of this aid has been administered through the Military Assistance Program; in some instances it has been rendered through the operating forces of the U.S. Navy. Such assistance has normally been limited to those tasks beyond the capability of the allied navies concerned.

The "Passage to Freedom" in Viet Nam and the evacuation of the Tachens were outstanding examples of the Navy's logistic support capabilities. Both were tactically successful. From the military standpoint both operations helped an ally preserve the integrity of his military forces; equipment and personnel were removed that otherwise would have fallen into enemy hands.¹² Both operations were retreats undertaken on the basis of both political and military considerations. Once the decision was made to retreat,

¹²In the evacuation of North Viet Nam the vast majority of the personnel transported by American naval forces were civilian refugees. In the Tachens most of the evacuees were military personnel.

the Navy's transport capability made it possible to retrieve some advantage from unfavorable political and military situations.

When measured against the objective of containment, the "Freedom Lift" and the Tachen evacuation must be classified as calculated strategic retreats to within the containment barrier as it was further defined by American statesmen. Ultimate definition of the barrier is, of course, determined by military and political realities.

The Tachen operation combined elements of aiding an ally, a military demonstration, and politico-humanitarian assistance. On the basis of events which have occurred since 1955, the Tachens clearly could have been held if they had been supported to the degree that the United States has since supported the Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu. To have supported the Tachens in this manner would have required considerable American military assistance on a continuing basis. The political disadvantages of maintaining Nationalist forces on the islands (clearly not vital to the defense of Taiwan) and the required magnitude of the military investment dissuaded Washington from supporting the Nationalist government in its efforts to hold the islands. In this situation political considerations ruled against the employment of the Navy's full assistance capability. Instead the Navy was made the primary executor of the decision to withdraw.

Operational support of Allied naval forces in Southeast Asia has been very limited and that given has been tailored to fit a few very sensitive situations. The reason for this limited use is that operational support, as indicated in Chapter III, comes very close to limited war. As a result, commitments involving operational support are closely controlled. A case in point is the very close supervision exercised by the Commander of the Seventh Fleet over American warships escorting Nationalist vessels to besieged Quemoy.¹³ Because of the security classification given to most operations of this nature, a meaningful evaluation of their effectiveness is not possible. Suffice it to say that up until the end of 1959 none of these operations had given rise to anything more than scattered clashes between American and Communist forces.

Police Action

Except for the Hainan incident described in Chapter IV, this portion of the naval spectrum has not been used in Southeast Asia by the United States since 1945. The examples of Korea and Lebanon testified to American willingness to use this part of the spectrum if circumstances required. However, Korea had shown that any major police action carried out adjacent to Communist China would probably result in limited war with that power. The new China simply could

¹³Murphy, 184.

not be treated feebly as a minor power. Hence, the military demonstration (and certain aspects of operational assistance) seemed to form the "brink of war" which the United States approached on several occasions subsequent to the Korean War.

Military Demonstrations

In spite of the apparent failure of the demonstration by American naval forces off Indo-China in April 1954, military demonstrations have been the most important type of operation conducted by the United States Navy in Southeast Asia since 1950.¹⁴ These demonstrations were conducted in direct support of the containment barrier, and brought the United States very close to open military conflict with Communist China.¹⁵

A pattern is discernible in the events provoking these demonstrations. On each occasion the United States was challenged through an ally or other power with which the United States had a community of security interests. This third power was subjected to heavy military pressure. The

¹⁴The reader is reminded that in assessing failure or success of an operation, the criteria stipulated supra, p. 96, are being used.

¹⁵The United States has conducted five naval demonstrations in Southeast Asia since 1945: (1) Indo-China, April, 1954; (2) Indo-China, June-July, 1954; (3) Tachen evacuation, February, 1955; (4) Quemoy, September, 1958; (5) Laos crisis, September, 1959. The Laos demonstration was not as well defined as the others and is not discussed in this study. Though not listed, the Taiwan Straits patrol could be considered a continuing demonstration.

United States was placed in the position of either coming to the rescue, usually under disadvantageous political conditions, or of suffering another loss in prestige and material strength. This pattern comprises part of what Kissinger calls "the Sino-Soviet strategy of ambiguity."¹⁶ The dilemma posed by the Sino-Soviet challenge, usually in the guise of indigenous movements, gave rise to many stresses and strains within the structure of Allied unity.

A pattern is discernible also in the American demonstrations undertaken in reaction to each of these provocations. Each American answer to the challenge was carried primarily by naval forces. Each time the American response became stronger and more resolute, though there was no lack of opposition both at home and abroad condemning that response. The more resolutely the demonstration has been executed, the more successful it seems to have been. However, these demonstrations have been too few in number to draw any firm conclusions in this respect.

The demonstration off the coast of Indo-China in April 1954 (at the time of the siege of Dienbienphu) was conducted in a tentative manner. Except for the fact that intervention was seriously considered this operation was closer to ambiguous maneuver to assist an ally than a demonstration to warn an aggressor. The demonstration was carried out at such a distance from the threatened point that

¹⁶Kissinger, 320-21.

any threat implied simply was not credible to the Viet Minh or the Chinese Communists. In the end political considerations precluded American intervention.¹⁷

A subsequent demonstration took place in June and July of 1954, during the Geneva Conference. There has been some speculation that this demonstration may have been instrumental in permitting the West to salvage South Viet Nam, and indeed the rest of Southeast Asia, after the French debacle in Indo-China.¹⁸ One reporter, basing his conclusions on a number of interviews with Secretary of State Dulles stated:

But again the policy of boldness impressed the Communists. Dulles had seen to it that the Chinese and the Soviets knew that the U.S. was prepared to act decisively to prevent the fall of all of Southeast Asia. . . . Thus instead of negotiating from the extreme and undisguised weakness of the French position, Mendès-France and Eden [at Geneva] found themselves able to bargain from Dulles' strength.¹⁹

However, the fact remains that North Viet Nam was lost to the Communists. There was, and is, scant consolation in the fact that more was not lost. The application of the demonstration technique did not improve the situation, but it possibly prevented a further deterioration.

The demonstration coincident with the evacuation of

¹⁷ See supra, pp. 24-25, 77.

¹⁸ Coral Bell [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 24-26, 71.

¹⁹ Shepley, 71.

the Tachen Islands was carried out with more resolution.²⁰ American forces were placed close enough to Communist positions and in such strength that their intention was unmistakable. Among those participating in the evacuation and demonstration there was little doubt that Communist opposition would have meant war. Although the Chinese Communists had little to gain by opposing the evacuation, the simple fact of the matter was that in spite of its threats "Communist China, in effect, temporarily submitted to U.S. naval power in the Pacific during the evacuation. . ."²¹

The most convincing example of the utility of the military demonstration occurred during the Quemoy crisis of 1958.

At Quemoy, an adversary with an army of 2,500,000 and over 1,800 jet fighters was induced to back off from a dangerous miscalculation without the Navy's having to fire a shot. To be sure, the Navy did not bring off these results alone. The weight of the Air Force was also conspicuously on the scales; and the Army's too, though in a much lesser amount. Yet the directing role was the Navy's. Quite properly the Navy now looks upon both the Lebanon and Quemoy crises as textbook examples of sea power's unique capacity for controlling "peripheral" incidents.²²

²⁰This should not be construed as criticism of the tactical commanders executing the demonstrations in the waters adjacent to Indo-China. The indecision with which the demonstrations were carried out merely seemed to reflect the indecision and lack of agreement among the leaders of the West. Roberts, 31-34.

²¹Richard P. Martin, "Mighty U.S. Fleet Presides Over Another Pull-out," U.S. News and World Report, February 18, 1955, p. 44.

²²Murphy, 180.

All of the demonstrations conducted by the United States in Southeast Asia since 1945 have been undertaken as a result of a challenge by the Communist Bloc to the containment barrier erected by the United States. When evaluated by the criterion set forth at the beginning of this section,²³ this technique has produced the following results: (1) failure in Indo-China in April 1954; (2) tactical success in Indo-China in June and July, 1954 and in the Tachens, February 1955; (3) complete success at Quemoy in September 1958.

The initial failure in Indo-China was due to the unfavorable political environment combined with the remote location of besieged Dienbienphu.²⁴ The subsequent demonstration at the time of the Geneva Conference was a tactical success in that it strengthened, to some degree, the hand of Western diplomats conducting the negotiations at Geneva. In a larger sense, however, more land and people were lost to Communism. The retreat was stopped; but the battle had already been lost. A similar occurrence was the Tachen evacuation. Communist China stood to gain little by opposing an evacuation that it was striving to bring about. The

²³Supra, p. 96.

²⁴The remote location of Dienbienphu was a factor only because of the unfavorable political environment. If the political environment had been more favorable, as for example, at the outset of the Korean War, the remote location would have been a tactical inconvenience, but not a bar to assistance for the defenders.

operation was a tactical success in that the narrow tasks given the Navy were efficiently completed without entering into hostilities with the Communist forces.

While the second Indo-Chinese and Tachen demonstrations were not entirely valid tests of the utility of the demonstration, at Quemoy in 1958 there was a perfect meshing of objective, capability and commitment. Communist China was forced to recoil before American naval power.

Again the United States proved to the world and especially to the peoples of Asia that it stood by its word, that espoused principles were not just idle words. . . .

There is a very clear lesson for the people of the United States in all this. Where sea power was used by the United States, where we could and did use it, our influence was felt. We quieted the situation; and we turned back the forces of aggression.²⁵

In a larger sense these demonstrations in the vicinity of Taiwan have all been part of a continuous (since June 27, 1950) naval demonstration by the United States. President Truman's employment of the fleet demonstrated a keen understanding of the military "facts of life" in East Asia. He, and subsequently President Eisenhower, indicated to the Chinese Communists what tyrants of the past had learned by bitter experience: when the seas and the air over them are held by free men, manning strong naval forces,

²⁵Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, before the New Orleans Council of the Navy League and members of the Council of the Chamber of Commerce of the greater New Orleans area, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 29, 1959. Emphasis added. Notice how Admiral Burke distinguishes between the capability and the commitment.

military invasion across the seas is impossible.²⁶ This failure to understand the sea, as they understood the land (and later the air), has in the past proved the tyrants' undoing. While this cause and effect may not be perceived by Peiping, the Chinese Communists cannot help but dwell on their impotence and frustration in the face of American naval power. In other times and in other places Communist land power has been an overpowering threat to free peoples. In Korea Chinese Communist armies held United Nations forces to a stalemate. In the Taiwan Strait the United States Navy has forced Peiping to accept a corresponding disagreeable status quo.

Some observers have asserted that one can gauge the effectiveness of measures limiting Communist expansion by the amount of vituperation that Moscow and Peiping pour upon those measures.²⁷ By this standard the mission of the Seventh Fleet, in showing the determination of the United States to contain Communist expansionism, has been successfully executed.

In view of the ambiguous American commitment vis-à-

²⁶This is the heritage of Salamis, Lepanto, the Spanish Armada, and the frustration of Napoleon and Hitler in their efforts to invade Great Britain.

²⁷For a selection of Chinese Communist documents denouncing the U.S. Navy's demonstrations off the coasts of China, see: The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Oppose U.S. Occupation of Taiwan and "Two Chinas" Plot (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), pp. 5, 15, 17, 23-24, 31, 38, 72.

vis the offshore islands,²⁸ the use of naval forces has offered the United States the best means of defending American interests in the Taiwan Strait. As indicated in Chapter III, the naval demonstration is admirably suited to situations where such ambiguity is a useful technique of foreign policy. Movements of naval forces can

readily be changed from a peaceful to a hostile character--by diverse announcements--and back again, . . . Their movements can be stopped on short notice and their meanings can be quickly reinterpreted. . . .²⁹

The commitment of land forces to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu would have been politically unfeasible and to some extent irrevocable. Land-based air forces while more flexible would have suffered other handicaps.³⁰

There has been some criticism of military demonstrations in general as being obsolete in the nuclear age. Alfred Vagts, implying that demonstrations as conducted by the West are bluffs, maintains that the threat inherent in the military demonstration is not credible to the Communist leaders. ". . . They refuse to be impressed by short of

²⁸Supra, 38-41.

²⁹Vagts, 235.

³⁰The principal disadvantage of using air elements in such a situation is the lack of "staying power" of aircraft. This limitation is aggravated during conditions of poor flying weather. Further, aircraft are inherently less capable of observing the precise niceties of a three or twelve mile limit. Finally, aircraft, because of their high speed and smaller size, are less visible--even on radar scopes. In many circumstances a visible deterrent is that which is most required.

war moves and gestures, because they are persuaded that their adversaries are not going to war even if they demonstrate."³¹ Writing before the Quemoy crisis of 1958, Vagts probably justified this opinion on the basis of the American reaction to the Berlin Blockade and the French defeat in Indo-China. Nevertheless, even before 1958, the entire history of the cold war showed that wherever the Soviet colonial empire was met with resolution and adequate force, its designs were thwarted. The events of the past fifteen years have shown that Vagts' view has validity only when applied to an offensive demonstration--one calculated to threaten rather than deter. With the possible exception of the demonstration conducted in conjunction with the Dien-bienphu crisis in 1954 this type of demonstration has not been conducted by the United States since 1945.

Henry Kissinger is more impressed with the contemporary value of the demonstration.

The United States, . . . requires a twentieth-century equivalent of "showing the flag," an ability and a readiness to make our power felt quickly and decisively, not only to deter Soviet aggression but also to impress the uncommitted with our capacity for decisive action.³²

He was particularly impressed with the limited war capability of the Navy's task forces, which he considered to have the diversity of capabilities so necessary in meeting Sino-Soviet challenges.³³

³¹Vagts, 232.

³²Kissinger, 165.

³³Kissinger, 264.

Salutary Presence

The effectiveness of salutary presence as applied by the United States in Southeast Asia has been limited. The presence of American naval forces has been considered by some nations in Southern Asia as a threat to their newly-won independence. This is a misconception that the Communists have taken great pains to cultivate.

To be effective this portion of the power spectrum requires that there be a mutually acknowledged community of security interests between the naval power utilizing salutary presence and the powers on whose behalf it is employed. Such a community of security interests normally requires that the nations involved have a similar image of the menace of the potential aggressor. This common image of the potential aggressor has been lacking in Southeast Asia since the end of World War II. "The Western Powers are . . . in the invidious position of wishing to defend countries, which do not wish to be defended, from dangers the existence of which their governments deny in public."³⁴

The menace of the Communist empire does not seem real to many of the peoples of Southeast Asia because of: (1) their relative geographic isolation from the centers of Communist power, (2) the lack of political sophistication among the peoples of the region, (3) the usually skillful

³⁴Collective Defence in Southeast Asia, 166.

Communist diplomacy.³⁵ On the other hand, the presence of Western naval power has aroused criticism, at least partly because of its unfortunate history as an instrument of colonial exploitation. Even in the post-war era Western naval power was deployed in attempts to put down independence movements. And, as Admiral Burke points out, "Memories are long in the Far East."

Except for a few lapses the American response to the Sino-Soviet threat under these conditions has been to use salutary presence very sparingly and judiciously. Visits by American naval forces to ports in Southeast Asia have been very limited except in the Philippines and Taiwan where special conditions exist.³⁶

The modest maneuvers conducted by the SEATO Powers have combined two elements distasteful to the uncommitted states of Southern Asia: (1) the presence of Western naval forces in the area, (2) collective security arrangements growing out of the cold war. These maneuvers, though frequent, have seldom been on a large scale. Here, it has been necessary to compromise between regard for neutralist

³⁵ Recently (1958-60), there have been some lapses in the skill of the Sino-Soviet diplomacy. The Red Chinese aggression in Tibet and India has aroused some alarm in Southeast Asia. Relations between Red China and Indonesia became acrimonious in 1959 as a result of internal policies of the Indonesian government, vis-à-vis the resident Chinese community.

³⁶ The United States has mutual security treaties with the Philippines and Taiwan giving the U.S. the right to base military forces on their respective territories.

feelings on the one hand and military effectiveness on the other. "A delicate balance has to be sought between too obtrusive a Western presence and a situation in which no real defense for the area exists."³⁷ The maneuvers seem to have been an effort to breathe life into SEATO rather than a serious attempt to perfect its military co-ordination.³⁸

To say that the salutary presence portion of the power spectrum should be used sparingly and judiciously in Southeast Asia is not to say that American naval power should be withdrawn to satisfy foreign critics.

We should, of course, seek to allay legitimate grievances, but we would be wrong to take every criticism at face value. . . . Many of our most voluble critics in Southeast Asia would be terrified were our military protection suddenly withdrawn. The neutrality of the uncommitted is possible, after all, only so long as the United States remains strong spiritually and physically.³⁹

Writing for an American audience Mohammed Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia, acknowledged that nation's contemporary relationship to the naval power of the West.

Indonesia, it may be said, is bounded by the British Navy and the American Navy, which control the Indian

³⁷ Collective Defence in Southeast Asia, 166.

³⁸ Although a convincing argument can be made for the need of such co-ordination, the forces of the SEATO nations have not been integrated to a degree even approaching those of NATO. August C. Miller, Jr., "SEATO--Segment of Collective Security," USNIP, LXXXVI (February, 1960), 54-56.

³⁹ Kissinger, 266.

and Pacific Oceans. But no one can say that Britain and the United States have evil designs on Indonesia. On the contrary, they are desirous of seeing Indonesia remain independent and prosperous.⁴⁰

Other Southeast Asia leaders are less candid--particularly when addressing domestic audiences.

In evaluating salutary presence it cannot be said to have failed in Southeast Asia. Under the existing circumstances it merely has not been the most useful tool for the task to be done. Given the existing political environment in Southeast Asia the Army and Air Force would have labored under even greater handicaps in trying to implement this portion of the spectrum.⁴¹

There are indications that a greater awareness of the Communist menace is growing among the governments, if not the peoples, of the area.⁴² The traumatic experience of India (a nation to which some of the nations in Southeast Asia look for political leadership) on her northern frontiers has been an example that has not gone unnoticed among Southeast Asian states. With further changes in the political climate salutary presence, quite possibly, will be more useful in future years in Southeast Asia, as the identity of

⁴⁰ Mohammed Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXI (April, 1953), 445.

⁴¹ See supra, pp. 64-65.

⁴² Yun Ho, "Foreign Relations," Communist China 1957 (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1958), pp. 193-94. See also Miller, 56-58.

the security interests between the West and free Asia is more clearly revealed to the latter.

Politico-humanitarian Assistance

Since World War II this portion of the spectrum has been applied by the United States in the Far East with conspicuous success. The Navy has been only one of the agencies of the U.S. Government employing this technique, but its contribution has been both significant and unique. To find a case in which such assistance did not foster good relations (or at least improved relations), between the United States and the recipient nation, would be difficult.

As has been indicated on several occasions in this study, the "Passage to Freedom" in Viet Nam was one of the outstanding propaganda successes of the cold war. In this operation the Navy exchanged its mailed fist for the velvet glove. From a powerful instrument that might have intervened at Dienbienphu, it was transformed into an instrument of humanity. Here, Western power was not used to shore up a tottering colonial regime, but was used to give Asians the means with which to exercise their right of self-determination as guaranteed in the U.N. Charter. Rather than gaining a transitory military victory over Communism and alienating many of its friends by military intervention, the United States in a dramatic humanitarian gesture, made possible by its great and flexible naval power, unmasked the face of Communism for all of Southeast Asia to see.

The evacuation of the civil population from the Tachens, although similar in purpose, was too beclouded by military considerations and the international unpopularity of the Taiwan regime to provide the dramatic impact of the "Passage to Freedom." Nevertheless, principles were maintained; the United States was determined that no person would fall under the Communist yoke as a result of the United States failing to provide the means whereby a free choice could be made.

Humanitarian assistance to other peoples has long been an attribute of the American national character. The idea that such assistance should be a political weapon is repugnant to most Americans. Happily for the United States in a world of realpolitik, humanitarian assistance is a means with which it can satisfy its altruistic propensities and gain its foreign policy objectives.

The tangible results of politico-humanitarian assistance are usually difficult to ascertain. They would appear to bear little relationship to a policy of containment. Such assistance, however, is one of the means with which the United States can make containment feasible. By demonstrating our community of interests in the area of human relations to nations such as those in Southeast Asia, it may be possible to demonstrate our identity of security interests and thus strengthen the containment barrier.

Humanitarian assistance, promptly and efficiently rendered, with no strings attached, has offered the United States one of its best opportunities to break down the suspicion towards Western naval power held by the states of Southeast Asia. When this assistance can be rendered by warships of the United States, some of the prejudice against the presence of American naval power can be dispelled. The American warship may in future years be the symbol of friendship and a community of security interests rather than an object of distrust and suspicion.

The Navy's Contribution

As indicated in Chapter II the over-riding security objective of the United States in Southeast Asia, as elsewhere, since World War II has been the construction and maintenance of a containment barrier to resist Communist encroachment. This objective implies the existence of a companion-objective: the strengthening of the free nations of Southeast Asia so that they may better preserve their independence and thus take their places on the bulwarks of freedom. Military protection has been essential to the nations of Southeast Asia during the unstable years following independence. Without it there would have been no time to make even a start at the tasks of building stable democratic institutions and viable economies.⁴³ This military protection

⁴³Collective Defence in Southeast Asia, 166.

has been rendered by the armed forces of the West--the Navy of the United States in particular.

Edgar Furniss has said: "Foreign policies, including military ones, must be content with partial coverage, partial results, temporary successes."⁴⁴ This observation applies to the results achieved by the employment of the spectrum of modern naval capabilities by the United States in Southeast Asia since 1945. Part of Indo-China was lost to the free world because of a failure to gauge properly the political tempo of the post-World War II era in Southeast Asia. The Navy could not retrieve this mistake. Subsequently, the Navy was utilized under more auspicious political circumstances and Communist aggression in Southeast Asia was first slowed down, and then brought to a halt at Quemoy in 1958. This is not to say that the Navy was the only instrument used to defend Southeast Asia; military and economic aid programs played an important role. The Navy, however, was the essential component in the power combination used by American statesmen.

The most vital naval contribution in Southeast Asia has been the military demonstration. The indication of the American willingness to use force to thwart Communist expansionism has been the key factor in implementing the containment concept in East Asia. The example of Korea indicated the lengths to which the United States would go to preserve

⁴⁴Furniss, vii.

the free world perimeter and lent realism to the message that the demonstrations conveyed. The example of the steadfast American stand at Quemoy in 1958 was duly noted, and quietly applauded even among some of the staunchest free Asian critics of U.S. policy.

As a result of the masterly handling of the Quemoy crisis in September 1958, U.S. prestige has risen throughout Southeast Asia. The fact that the United States could and would act immediately and decisively with its military striking power in defense of an Asian ally had a most impressive effect on the Treaty area countries and served as a somber warning to the Communists.⁴⁵

Salutary presence has not been as useful a tool in Southeast Asia as it has been in the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet has operated in an area where there are many treaty allies of the United States. While its presence has been the cause of some resentment by the United Arab Republic and considerable vituperation by the Soviet Union, it has been welcomed by those states on the northern shores of the Mediterranean which are nearer the Soviet threat. In Southeast Asia there remains a need for a greater awareness of the nature of the Sino-Soviet menace before salutary presence will be a more useful tool for American statesmen to employ.

Politico-humanitarian assistance offers the United States the greatest opportunity to expose Communist intentions and demonstrate American intentions and capabilities.

⁴⁵Miller, 55-56.

The United States should maintain and further develop its readiness to render this type of aid. The interest which greeted the new "Great White Fleet" proposals and "Project Hope" are an indication that these concepts have a great popular appeal in the United States.⁴⁶

The combination of national (including naval) capabilities required to achieve American foreign policy objectives in the years ahead is certain to change with political developments and advances in technology. The task of the statesman will continue to involve the employment of the various instruments of national policy in correct proportions in order to realize national aspirations.

The ideal instrument for the statesman in the cold war era is that which precisely conveys his intentions and capabilities to his foreign counterparts. Such an instrument must be flexible unless there is to be an economically unacceptable number of instruments, each highly specialized for only one or two tasks. In the military field such a flexible instrument is the modern navy, whose response, indeed, "can vary from a cautioning gesture to an atomic bomb."⁴⁷

The versatility and virtuosity of the U.S. Navy has been amply demonstrated by the events in Southeast Asia

⁴⁶Life, July 27, 1959, pp. 17-25.

⁴⁷Murphy, 83.

since 1945. In the years to come the continued survival of the free world may well depend on the skill with which this instrument is employed strategically by statesmen and tactically by naval officers on the scattered battlefields of the cold war. Never has the challenge been greater nor the instrument more capable.

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
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